Chapter Three

I

In the face of a profound sense of disruption, in the 1940s thinkers across East Africa sought to (re)establish social harmony, and under the influence of particular models of human belonging, with their origins in the Bible and spread by comparison, imagined novel historical communities and developed novel forms of historical consciousness. In turn, the disorder against which these communities were called into being came to be understood to be the principle threat against which people tried to defend civil, reputable and prosperous communities. As the post-Second World War invigoration of the colonial state gathered pace in East Africa as the 1940s rolled into the 1950s, however, colonial rule itself was increasingly cast as the central threat to a good collective life. In this period, the need for independence became widely, and radically, asserted, even as great continuities in thinking about a good collective life continued to occupy much of public debate. This imperative to independence entered a context in which community, and what ailed it, was well-established as the central object of public argument, and, in turn, led African thinkers to further shape their visions of community, increasing the divergence between imaginations of community particular to Kenya and Tanganyika. The following two chapters follow the stories of the drive for independence in Kenya and, first, Tanganyika and its effect upon the imagination of community.

II

In the 1940s and early 1950s, thinkers across East Africa held, in general, that African self-help and African initiative could make their ethnic, racial or territorial communities civil, reputable and prosperous inside a somewhat reformed imperial community. They acknowledged the destructive potential of a colonialism which, they suggested, showed signs of having lost a sense of its historic mission, but nonetheless, saw too a creative potential in an on-going imperial connection. From the mid-1950s, however, this understanding was overturned in Tanganyika and colonialism was recast as the primary obstacle to the recognition and *maendeleo* of the colonised people - a term used by writers in the press in this period to discuss progress, drawing on a post-war global language of 'development' (which largely, but not entirely, displaced the inter-war language of 'civilisation', rendered in Swahili as '*ustaraabu*'), and which carried with it a web of meanings, as Emma Hunter has argued, being used by thinkers to reflect the colonial state's post-war emphasis on development projects (discussed in Chapter One), to refer to specifically political development, and, more generally, to refer to changes associated with 'modernity' and the need to adapt in various ways to meet such challenges, to a wider sense of human flourishing.[1]

East Africa was hardly alone in this rejection. While the British might not have intended the post-war liquidation of their empire, anti-colonial sentiment was increasingly evident across the imperial landscape in the years after the Second World War. In the year the war ended, for example, the Pan-African Congress held in Manchester made clear its intention to put the end of empire on the post-war agenda. Two years later, in 1947, India gained her independence, the fulfilment of a promise made in the dark days of 1942, while in Africa itself, vigorous nationalist movements demanding independence made themselves felt in the late 1940s in Ghana and (parts of) Nigeria, movements which forced the British to re-think their plans and make unexpected constitutional

[1] Hunter, *Political Thought*, pp. 44-6.

concessions, leading to Ghana achieving internal self-rule in 1951 and full independence in 1957, the first of Britain's African colonies to do so. Nor, indeed, was this unravelling a peculiarly British phenomenon. In 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale began the violent struggle for the independence of Algeria, long regarded in the metropole as an integral part of France itself. Four years later, Guinea voted for independence, a blow to efforts, French and African, to redesign their association to the advantage of both. And in 1960, the 'year of Africa', and the moment at which hopes for a French federation in the wider West African region collapsed, Belgium abandoned the Congo, fearful of growing popular unrest.[2] Calls for freedom rang loud.

East Africa was not insulated from these ideas and trends. India's independence, and its possible consequences for Tanganyika in the post-League of Nations world, for example, were the subject of some discussion in Tanganyika's English-language press in the mid-1940s[3], while, as we shall see, nationalist figures from elsewhere, above all Kwame Nkrumah, and events connected to independence in other colonies, notably the Congo, came to feature regularly in Tanganyika's nationalist press in the 1950s and early 1960s. These external influences, however, did not make the rejection of colonial rule in Tanganyika inevitable: as we saw in the last chapter, even as Nkrumah forced concessions from the British in Ghana in the late 1940s, thinkers in Tanganyika focussed their energies on reforming colonial rule. These wider currents, rather, only came to take root in Tanganyika in the context of shifting internal conditions.

A sense of the frustrated possibility of reform played a crucial role here. In the early post-war period, African hopes for an imperialism which acknowledged both the paramountcy of African interests and their humanity, and which benevolently promoted African development, appeared to be routinely frustrated. Racial discrimination, an insult to the dignity of Africans, seemed to continue unchecked, despite longstanding public complaints. Echoing arguments common in the 1940s, a

[2] For a recent overview, see Allman, 'Between the Present and History', pp.224-42. See also, Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, pp. 49-53, pp.58-9, Cooper, *Africa in the World*, Ch.3, Schmidt, 'Top Down or Bottom Up?', pp.975-1014, R.J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford, 2009), Chs.17-19. For an imperial perspective see Darwin, *Unfinished Empire*, Ch.11 and Darwin, *Empire Project*, Chs.12-14.

[3] E.g. *Tanganyika Standard*, Letter 'Observers', 20th April 1946, p.17, *Tanganyika Standard*, Letter Mwamba, 4th May 1946, pp.18-19, *Tanganyika Standard*, 'African Observer', 4th May 1946, p.19.

writer in *Mwafrika* told in 1958, for example, of his displeasure at the separation of African and non-African guests at a ceremony marking the opening of a road in Tanga Province. He asked ironically whether this division amounted to 'saying there was no African [not] even one who deserved to eat at one table with those Whites and Indians?', and concluded that such an attitude both stood in the way of the development of the country, and 'was also a very big insult for those African guests who were invited', a denial of their humanity, a failure of recognition.[4]

Colonial efforts at post-war change, indeed, far from offering meaningful reform, often seemed to entrench both obstacles to African recognition and the foreign privilege which had long been seen to threaten African prosperity. Giving expression to African hopes of a benevolent colonialism run in the interests of the African people, the Tanganyika African Association had asked in 1950 for constitutional reform which would have seen Africans, Europeans and Asians, 'elect[ing] Common Representation by a Common Electoral Roll' to the Legislative Council, immediately in urban areas, and following a period of twelve years of development in rural areas, during which time forty five per cent of seats would have been reserved for non-Africans (the combined population of Indians and Europeans) giving Africans an unofficial majority from the off. Their proposals, they made clear, were underpinned by the 'absolute conviction that any policy designed to develop this territory constitutionally on racial lines is wrong'. They asserted the primacy of African interests, and told, moreover, of their 'alarm and disgust at the recent irresponsible resolutions and utterances of a minority community in this territory and in Kenya', a reference to the settler-authored Kenya Plan of 1949[5], resolutions and utterances which were 'made in an attempt to assert their selfish motives over the other races under the disguise of their superiority.' They would, they concluded, regard any move to shore up the position of settlers, and hand 'leadership' of the territory to them as 'an act of BETRAYAL on the part of the British Government as trustees to us their ward.'[6]

[4] *Mwafrika*, Letter Shabani Shimbo, 18th October 1958, p.2.
[5] Maxon, *Britain and Kenya's Constitutions*, pp.30-1.
[6] BNA, CO 691/208/12, Memorandum African Association, Dar es Salaam Branch to Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Colonial Development, 21st May 1950, pp.1-12. Original emphasis.

The reform they got (a reform which emerged from a period of consultation initiated by a statement from the Secretary of State for the Colonies on constitutional policy across East Africa in light of developments in West Africa and settler agitation closer to home) seemed precisely to amount to this 'betrayal'.[7] When the Constitutional Development Committee published its conclusions in 1953, 'multi-racialism', the constitutional development of the territory which built upon racial divisions, entrenching communal representation, was the order of the day. The Committee recommended the establishment of a Legislative Council composed of an official majority and twenty-one unofficials, shared equally between the three races of the territory. Instead of holding a majority and having a clear plan for a move towards a single territorial electorate, Africans thereby found themselves with a mere 33% of unofficial seats and a government which insisted that this constitutional settlement would remain in place for the foreseeable future.[8] The reform, in short, seemed to entrench both the inferior status of Africans and the privilege of the non-African minority, subordinating the interests of the African majority to the sectional interests of minority immigrant populations.

The direction of colonial reform in the 1950s, then, seemed to be making colonialism increasingly fraught with danger. Constitutional reform, however, was but the tip of the iceberg: it was, above all, in the agrarian reforms which characterised the second colonial occupation that these new dangers were experienced.[9] In the aftermath of the Second World War (as we saw in Chapter One), colonial interest in intervening in African agriculture grew, their officers' minds filled with the terror of desertification. Immediately post-war, five regional development schemes, in Mubulu, Usukuma, Kondoa, Usambara and Uluguru were initiated, the focal points of this new colonial charge, designed primarily to deal with the apparent threat posed by soil erosion, while over the next decade these and additional schemes were developed with more directly economic ends in

[7] Maxon, *Britain and Kenya's Constitutions*, pp.34-5.
[8] Illiffe, 'Breaking the Chain', pp.170-1. C. Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy* (Nairobi, 1978), pp.28-9.
[9] E.g. Illiffe, 'Breaking the Chain', pp.170-1. Illiffe, *Modern History*, pp.535-6. Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development*, p.320.Reid, *Modern Africa*, p.253.

mind. For all their post-war sense of mission, however, the charge itself looked more like a crawl, the plans' hesitant first years characterised by 'much discussion and little action'.[10] Typically, as the goals of the schemes came to be formulated and reformulated in light of Britain's shifting post-war conception of empire, they were implemented first as pilot projects in small areas, and then, often as a response to resistance in those areas, increasingly widely as the 1940s rolled into the 1950s.[11] Unpopular from their inception, these schemes not only added to the sense of disorder that characterised life in the region, but associated British planning with attacks on wealth and on life.

In Uluguru, for example, where the focal point of the scheme was the communal building of terraces, these demands were understood to threaten the autonomy of household heads and their proper freedom of action, compromising their ability to feed their own dependents.[12] Likewise, the Masai Development Plan, begun in 1951 ostensibly with the aim of 'modernising' the group in light of the new imperative to economic development, seemed to threaten local livelihoods by alienating both the right to make decisions, in turn blocking local efforts to strengthen and diversify the local economy through engagement in agriculture, and the natural resources on which their semi-nomadic pastoralism was based. To add insult to injury, despite being financed by the Masai themselves, the planning and implementation of the scheme was a strictly British affair, denying Masai any say and leading to complaints about the lack of respect shown to their elders.[13] In Usambara, meanwhile, soil erosion measures, which amounted to a capital investment in land, both reduced the scope household heads had to make use of the area's diverse ecology, to manage the production and reproduction of their household, and threatened to undermine a local guarantee that all people with local roots would have access to the minimal land needed to ensure their

[10] P.A. Maack, '"We Don't Want Terraces!" Protest and Identity Under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme', in J.L. Giblin and I.N. Kimambo, (eds.), *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania* (London, 1996), p.156.
[11] E.g. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, pp.167-7-0. Maack, 'Terraces', pp.156-8.
[12] Maack, 'Terraces', p.161.Similar fears were evident in the face of government interference in 1930s Bukoba, on which see Weiss, *Sacred Trees*, pp.154-5.
[13] Hodgson, *Intrepid Warriors*, p.103, pp.116-8. & p.119.

subsistence, throwing into doubt the lives of the most socially marginal.[14] It was destocking campaigns, like the one pushed in Lake Province from 1952, however (which aimed to protect the land by reducing the density of livestock), which were the single most controversial aspect of post-war plans, and which were fiercely resented by populations which relied on livestock for meat, milk, trade and ritual payments, and who became increasingly suspicious that, far from providing life-giving patronage, the colonial state was engaged in a concerted effort to make them poorer.[15] Far from being benevolent, post-war colonialism seemed to both confirm the low status and place obstacles in the way of the prosperity of the colonised people.

These schemes took on an especially sinister air in a post-war world in which the Colonial Office and the administration in Tanganyika gave a central place to white agriculture in their plans to 'develop' the territory, and as the white population of the territory doubled in the decade after 1948, the area of land alienated increased, and people in certain places, most famously those living in the shadow of Mount Meru, were forcibly moved from fertile highlands to arid lowlands to facilitate the development of a European dairy industry.[16] In these circumstances, rumours circulated, especially in the north-east, that colonial development schemes were but the first stage in an effort to remove Africans from the land.[17] This further entrenchment of foreign privilege and the subordination of Africans to settler interests exercised imaginations and led people to lose yet more confidence in colonialism's creative potential.

The image of a benevolent colonialism could not survive these developments: colonial patronage was shown to be barren.[18] By the mid-1950s, the innovations of the post-war period were the target of vigorous criticisms. In June 1952, for example, Meru delegates took their land case to the UNO.[19] In February 1953, representatives of the Mwanza branch of the Tanganyika African

[14] Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, Ch.7.
[15] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development*, pp.151-181.
[16] Spear, *Mountain Farmers*, Ch.11. Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', pp.113-16. See also Chapter One.
[17] Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p.164 & p.192. Hodgson, *Intrepid Warriors*, pp.111-2.
[18] See J. Lonsdale, 'Ornamental Constitutionalism in Africa: Kenyatta and the Two Queens', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol.34, No.1, (2006), pp.87-103.
[19] Spear, *Mountain Farmers*, pp.226-30.

Association met Lake Province's Provincial Commissioner to complain about measures associated with destocking initiatives.[20] In Uluguru, four thousand people marched in 1955 protesting against soil erosion measures, defiantly chanting 'We don't want terraces, give us back our old ways'.[21] And the unpopularity of multi-racialism was dramatically illustrated by the substantial protests which accompanied short-lived efforts to develop local government institutions along these lines in Geita in March 1958.[22]

The immediacy of these new dangers invigorated the lethargic Tanganyika African Association, from whose shell emerged the more dynamic Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), in July 1954, an organisation born with criticisms of the 1953 recommendations of the Constitutional Development Committee, demands for an African majority in the Legislative Council, and calls for 'the suspension of destocking campaigns which were alleged to be a ruse of the Government to impoverish the African and ensure that he was financially incapable of educating his children, in its mouth.[23] TANU's leaders centred their criticism on the role of the colonial state and offered, in a novel move, independence as a solution to these specific inequities, carrying their message up and down the territory in a single Land Rover, a punishing schedule of evangelism.[24] The party, in turn, gained support on the back of its willingness to engage local discontent and to acknowledge the ultimate control of the British over these developments.[25] As we shall see, however, the party was never merely the 'unmoved movers of nationalist discourse', nor the sole generators of moral and political thought, but rather a broad church, subject to internal and external criticism, and consistently caught up in an effort to maintain discipline and unity.[26] In their wake grew up a nationalist supporting press, most notably *Mwafrika*, *Kiongozi*, and *Ngurumo*, which

[20] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development*, p.173.
[21] Maack, 'Terraces', p.152.
[22] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development*, pp.325-6.
[23] BNA, CO 822/859, (East Africa. Original Correspondence. Activities of the Tanganyika African National Union), Summary of the Territorial Conference of the Tanganyika African Association Held at Dar es Salaam on 6th-10th July, 1954, pp.1-2.
[24] Illiffe, *Modern History*, pp.519-20.
[25] Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p.212. Illiffe, *Modern History*, p.527.
[26] Brennan, *Taifa*, p.160.

generated ideas, challenged, implicitly and explicitly, the leadership of TANU, and provided a forum for wider debate about the nature of the past, present and future. In the context of this dynamic, colonialism was reimaged.

The burdens and dangers of the post-war period, in short, led African thinkers, under the influence of West Africa's earlier anti-colonial movements, to a reassessment of the nature and potential of colonialism which transcended the conditions which generated this rethinking. In this process, the reformism which characterised African thinking in the 1940s and early 1950s was replaced by the dramatic insistence that colonialism was the single biggest (but not, as we shall see, the only) obstacle to the emergence of, in particular, reputable and prosperous community.

While thinkers in the 1940s had condemned aspects of colonial rule, particular policies or perceived policy directions, for the racism, the denial of the humanity of Africans and their potential as human beings, which underpinned them, Julius Nyerere, TANU's president and most visible figure, went significantly further. In speeches given to both local and international audiences, and drawing heavily on an understanding of Christian brotherhood, he repeatedly argued that colonialism itself, and the hierarchy it implied, amounted to an institutionalised form of non-recognition.[27] '[A]ll people', he held, 'were creatures with equal rights before God.'[28] 'Every man has been made in God's image', he reiterated, 'and, is therefore worthy of respect.'[29] Foreign rule, he argued, was a denial of this. It was predicated on an unjustifiable racism which held that some groups were fitter to rule than others and which made 'colour the criterion for human rights'. This had allowed both 'one country' to order 'the affairs of another against the wishes of the people of that country,' and 'a small minority' within the country, to appoint 'itself the masters of an unwilling majority'.[30] Colonialism was not, therefore, a gateway to the adulthood of the modern world, but a confinement to a never-ending state of adolescence. Racism and colonial rule were inseparable. It was, it

[27] On the 'politics of recognition', see C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in C. Taylor and A. Gutman, (eds.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, 1994), pp.25-73. On honour and independence, see Iliffe, *Honour*, pp.306-9.
[28] *Mwafrika*, 19th December 1959, p.4.
[29] *Tanganyika Standard*, 18th January 1960, p.1
[30] J. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity: A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1952-1965* (London, 1967), p.76.

followed, a 'disgrace to be ruled'. If the colonised people of the world were to gain the recognition that was due to them as human beings, colonialism had to go: it could not be reformed, but must be abolished.

Nyerere's emphasis was widely picked up and restated. It had a prominent place in the 'TANU Hymns' sung at public meetings, which often included his refrain that 'To be ruled is disgraceful'.[31] *Bibi* Titi Mohamed, the formidable head of the Women's Section of TANU, similarly echoed the argument, telling an audience of six hundred in Dar es Salaam in August 1958, for example, that their ancestors had fought at the onset of colonial rule against 'the disgrace of being ruled.'[32] The people of the territory, wrote F.J. Kashaija in a similar vein, were 'determined to free themselves from the yoke of a disgraceful colonial subjection'.[33] And Balthazar Masalu emphasised the point when he explained that 'recognising the inherent dignity and rights which are equal and which cannot be taken by force from any human, is the foundation of *uhuru*'.[34] By the second half of the 1950s, the imperial connection itself was widely understood to deprive the colonised people of their humanity: those same people now sought to reclaim it.

Nyerere's central theme was a moral one: it did not depend either on conscious intention or the material effects of colonialism. As he wrote in December 1961, 'Even if they [the colonialists] have always done their best to do what they believed to be good for us… it would be no less wrong. A man who tries to control the life of another does not destroy the other any less because he does it, as he thinks, for the other's benefit. It is the principle which is wrong'.[35] He was, nonetheless, under no illusions that the material consequences of colonial rule had been far from benign in effect, and noted that the colonial assumption of a racial hierarchy was manifest in materially discriminatory policies. Tanganyika's rulers had assumed, he explained in 1952, 'that we', Europeans, 'are specially

[31] BNA, FCO, 141/17798, (Tanganyika African National Union: Publications), 'TANU Hymns, Appendix B'.
[32] *Mwafrika*, 9th August 1958, p.3. On *Bibi* Titi, see Geiger, *TANU Women*.
[33] *Tanganyika Standard*, Letter F.J. Kashaija, 18th February 1959, p.2.
[34] *Kiongozi*, Letter Balthazar Masalu, 1st October 1958, p.2.
[35] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, p.133.

designed to be masters and others specially designed to be hewers of wood and drawers of water'.[36] As a consequence, '*utajiri*', wealth, in Tanganyika, lay 'in the hands of foreign nations and poverty in the hands of Africans.'[37] Nyerere, however, did little to develop this theme. Others, though, went beyond his fairly mild critique of the material effects of the colonial system, to present a damning critique of its exploitativeness, and its effects in frustrating the *maendeleo* of the *raia*, or citizens.

On the conservative side, F.J. Kashaija, rejected the insistence of the colonialists that economic development must precede independence. *Uhuru*, he insisted, was the necessary condition of *maendeleo*: economic development was only possible 'after a mental and physical relief from the pressure of imperialism.' 'The fear of possible trouble from the humiliated masses', he went on, 'frightens away capital investments' and so was 'a hindrance to economic development.'[38] Far from enabling economic development through the creation of a stable *pax*, British colonialism, he argued, had created psychic instability, retarding development.

Other criticisms were far more radical. Marking a significant departure from the previous decade, when reform-minded African intellectuals had tended to critique the reality of British colonialism by contrasting it with the ideals of its own self-appointed civilising mission, from the mid-1950s, critics of colonialism increasingly recast the imperial relationship as inherently exploitative, unceremoniously toppling Livingstone from his seat as arbiter of all. Drawing on the writings of Kwame Nkrumah, this idea was most systematically developed in editorials and comment pieces in the popular Swahili-language newspaper *Mwafrika* (a staunch supporter of TANU, albeit one whose radicalism was sometimes regarded with suspicion by the party's top brass) in the build-up to the Legislative Council elections of September 1958.[39] An editorial published in August of that year, for example, drew attention to the greed which stood behind colonial rule. Apparently quoting from a letter penned by a white settler in the Kenyan press, its author set out the interest of the imperial powers in maintaining colonies as an essential source of natural resources: the French were

[36] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, p.29.
[37] *Mwafrika*, 19th December 1959, p.4.
[38] *Tanganyika Standard*, Letter F.J. Kashaija, 18th February 1959, p.2.
[39]Sturmer, *Media History*, p.67.

desperate for the oil of the Sahara; the British held Kuwait as 'the great origin of oil and petrol'. The continent of Africa was the 'origin of many "dollars"', it was explained, which were desperately needed by a Britain ravaged by the Second World War to pay off American debts and for American goods. 'He who rules', the writer apparently quoted, 'has a voice in the whole of Africa and in the copper mines of Rhodesia'.

Developing a second aspect of colonial exploitativeness, the piece argued that the whole colonial system had been founded upon European efforts to find markets for their surplus goods. Securing these markets had required the establishment of 'Protective Tariffs', which both kept out the goods of foreign competitors, and protected the wares of the metropole from peripheral competition. Taking deliberate aim at both the civilising pretensions of the British and the terms of the trusteeship agreement (terms which, as we have seen, Africans in the 1940s argued vigorously for) the author reminded his readers of the commercial origins of the chartered companies which had crept into East Africa in the 1890s, and asserted that 'the Government arrived to protect its Business people only, not to teach me and you to rule ourselves'.[40] The same point was forcefully made in an editorial of two months earlier which claimed that 'We all know that Englishmen are here in our home for the reason of sucking our blood', a metaphor for exploitation, 'and getting advantages for themselves'; not 'to teach us *ustaarabu* or to bring us the *maendeleo* of our country'.[41]

The imperial connection was not capable of bringing *maendeleo* to the colonies, as African writers in the press had argued in the 1940s and as the British continued to argue, but was the cause of material ills. '[T]he cure of all this' *Mwafrika's* editors therefore concluded, 'is *UHURU*', which would mean the end of an economic system designed to benefit the people of the metropole, and would allow the colonised people to use their economic resources to improve their own standards of life.[42] As Nkrumah was reported to have put it in his book *Towards Colonial Freedom*: '"There is no

[40] *Mwafrika*, 23rd August 1958, p.5.
[41] *Mwafrika*, 1st June 1958, p.5. On blood sucking as a metaphor for exploitation, see Brennan, *Taifa*, Ch.5.
[42] *Mwafrika*, 23rd August 1958, p.5. Original emphasis.

way of accomplishing this thing [*maendeleo*] except for the *wananchi* [literally sons of the soil] to take responsibility for their country, to get *uhuru* and to rule themselves. *Uhuru* is the key which you want to remove the constraints on wealth and to bring *maendeleo*."'[43]

Mwafrika's editors, Kheri Rashidi Bagdelleh and Robert Makange, suffered for their bold argument: convicted of sedition, they were imprisoned for six months.[44] Their radical complaint was, however, widely echoed, both by elements within TANU as well as letter writers in the press. Rashidi Kawawa, a prominent member of TANU, member of the Legislative Council and trade unionist, for example, told an audience in Mbeya in November 1958 that 'This country is poor because they suck our wealth away from us and our riches go to Europe', and claimed that the British 'must be removed before they bring Tanganyika to the level of poverty to which they reduced India.'[45] A. Willy explained in a letter to *Mwafrika*, that, contrary to the arguments of both the colonial government and the nationalist leaders, Tanganyika was far from being a poor country. Disputing the idea that 'we have got much aid from England', he claimed that the price of the primary products of Tanganyika were set artificially low by the British, who then sold these goods on to third countries at an enormous profit using their political control of the territory to benefit themselves economically, and leaving Tanganyika's population 'always… poor.'[46] '[T]he *wananchi*', M.A. Mbunda similarly argued, 'began to get hardships from the time when foreign nations began to enter into the continent of Africa. These foreigners', he claimed, 'were weeds in the *shamba*' of Africa, and had 'destroyed the *wananchi* by denying them the food which is their right'. Again, he asserted that Africa was not a poor continent, but one whose wealth 'has been taken by… foreigners.' The English, like Indians, had contributed little and taken much: they had given only their language, while their wealth had been made in and from the continent, at the expense of the people they had found there.[47]

[43] *Mwafrika*, 1st June 1958, p.5.
[44] Scotten, 'Tanganyika's African Press', pp.13-14.
[45] BNA, FCO 141/17747 (Tanganyika: Statements by Political Leaders 1958-61), African Political Affairs, p.3.
[46] *Mwafrika*, Letter A. Willy, 30th May 1959, p.2.
[47] *Mwafrika*, Letter M.A. Mbunda, 9th September 1961, p.21.

In this period, then, colonialism was reimagined as inherently bad, a destructive force without creative potential. This shift was vividly conveyed when writers offered independence as a solution to complaints made in the earlier period. *Bibi* Joice Kilabaka, for example, rounded off her angry letter on the poor standard of the housing offered to African workers in Tanganyika's expanding towns compared to that given to workers of other races, a longstanding complaint by the late 1950s, by insisting that such discriminatory practices 'will only be completely finished when this country has obtained its *uhuru*'.[48] Giving a more general expression to this sense, Charles N. Kamata asked whether his audience knew 'that to be ruled is bad'?[49] K. Philipos wrote in *Mwafrika* in 1959 of the 'tyranny' which had existed under the 'foreign administration', and called on chiefs (many of whom had been involved in the 'Chiefs Conventions' of 1957 and 1958, which looked at ways of moderating the full impact of majority rule) to bear this in mind and to cooperate with their subjects in the effort to attain independence.[50] A.M.P. Tibenderana told his fellow readers that Nyerere deserved great honour for the things which he had done for them, 'Especially making every African understand that to be ruled is a bad thing.'[51] And in *Mwafrika*, Mwabugu Sarai hailed Nyerere as a 'prophet', explaining how before coming into contact with TANU he 'did not understand or comprehend what the damage or advantages of being ruled were'. He finished his letter by claiming that 'there is no person at all who is a human being and who does not know that to be ruled is bad.'[52]

Summing up this sense, an editorial in *Kiongozi*, published in November 1959, told of how

> *This word UHURU has been very much in the air in the country, even goats and cows and other animals have heard it and are tired. It has been written in newspapers and discussed in meetings, in neighbourhoods… in markets etc., it has been advertised on the radio, even it has been squeezed inside our ears. And it will continue like this until the British Government gives us what we all want, meaning UHURU.*[53]

[48] *Mwafrika*, Letter *Bi*. Joice Kilabaka, 25th April 1959, p.2. On earlier complaints see e.g. BNA, CO 691/202/1, Memorandum of the Tanganyika African Association Headquarters to the United Nations Mission whilst in Tanganyika at Dar es Salaam, 1948, p.5.
[49] *Kiongozi*, Letter Charles N. Kamata, 1st April 1958, p.2.
[50] *Mwafrika* Letter K. Philipos, 2nd May 1959, p.2. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p.225.
[51] *Kiongozi*, Letter A.M.P. Tibenderana, 15th August 1959, p.3.
[52] *Mwafrika*, Letter Mwabugu Sarai, 9th May 1959, p.2.
[53] *Kiongozi*, 17th November 1959, p. 4. Original emphasis.

By the late 1950s, then, independence from British rule, power, was widely seen as a necessary condition for a good collective life, colonialism as an obstacle, in terms borrowed from longer-standing arguments, to collective prosperity and reputation. Over the previous decade and a half, however, the colonised people had imagined themselves to belong to a number of overlapping communities; the recasting of colonial rule in the second half of the 1950s increasingly pushed them to think more carefully about how the relationships between these communities should be configured.

III

This new imperative to independence did not enter a vacuum. It intruded, rather, into a context in which the fate of communities and what ailed those communities had been the central object of public argument for the better part of two decades. In their efforts to call forth order from chaos, thinkers and writers in Tanganyika had in the 1940s imagined the existence of overlapping visions of ethnic, continental and territorial communities, and had argued over and over about the relationship between men and women and these communities, the question of what people owed these communities. Before the mid-1950s, however, away from the margins, African thinkers felt little pressure in Tanganyika to organise the relationship between these visions in any systematic way. As a new understanding of the obstacles posed by colonial rule to the recognition and prosperity of the colonised people developed from the mid-1950s, however, and as efforts were made to remove colonial rule, people were forced to consider more clearly their relationship.

Across the 1950s and into the 1960s, the search for civil, reputable and prosperous *ethnic* communities, continued to feature prominently in public debate, a staple of press comment. The impact of the second colonial occupation was, after all, in the first instance, local, these interventions conceived in explicitly ethnic terms, and, unsurprisingly, ethnically based associations were prominent in the defence of local communities.[54] These initiatives often exacerbated the sense of disorder that was widely held to characterise life across the region, and which continued apace as commercial production continued its expansion, albeit somewhat more slowly than it had in the first half of the 1950s, and the population of towns continued to burgeon.[55] Much public discussion, therefore, continued to focus on themes which had dominated the earlier period. In Bukoba, for example, the conduct of women, and the impact of their behaviour on the reputation of the ethnic group, continued to exercise the minds of ethnic patriots.[56] For Yeronimo John and others writing in

[54] Hodgson, *Intrepid Warriors*, pp.100-1.
[55] See Ch.1.
[56] Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, pp.168-71.

Kiongozi in late 1956*,* what they perceived as the demise of their ethnic language, widely seen in the 1940s as the key indicator of engagement in ethnic community, anchoring people in their group, was a cause for serious concern in the context of continued labour migration. John worried, as others had before him, that the Kinyamwezi language was dying out amongst urban youths and being replaced in day to day interaction by Swahili. Time and money needed to be invested, he therefore argued, to establish and promote both a Kinyamwezi language newspaper and Kinyamwezi language Primary Schools. Without such steps his honourable ethnic group would, by implication, die out.[57] And *Bibi* K. Nassibu, writing in *Mwafrika* in 1959, called for both self-recognition and concerted action to drive her tribe forward. All 'those Digo who these days are A[frican]D[istrict]O[fficers], head teachers, doctors' and so on, should, she demanded, as a patriotic duty return to their ethnic community and 'wake up the Digo', putting themselves, and their education, at the service of their descent group. She contrasted the situation of other tribes in the territory which, she noted, 'have their [own] ruler' with the Digo who continued to do without one, advised that a 'political association for all Digo' should be established and push for the election of a Digo chief, and asserted that 'it is a Digo only who has the right of ruling the Digo'. 'It is a disgrace' she concluded, that the group had 'not recognised itself', had no 'voice', and did not 'even know its rights'.[58]

To these long-standing concerns, new themes were added in the 1950s. The impact of the second colonial occupation, as well as the associated efforts of the colonial state to reform native authorities, led African thinkers to show a sharper concern with the structure of local government, and above all its impact upon the quest for civil, reputable and prosperous ethnic communities.[59] As Boniface Mwakibeta wrote in *Mwafrika* in mid-1960, if central government was being changed, from British to Tanganyikan control, then local government, 'which is nearer to us', most certainly warranted reform.[60] On Kilimanjaro, for example, the nature and basis of local government was a

[57] *Kiongozi*, Letter Yeronimo John, August 1956, p.4.
[58] *Mwafrika*, Letter Bi. K. Nassibu, 19th December 1959, p.2
[59] On colonial thinking on 'democratisation' see Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', p.176.
[60] *Mwafrika*, Letter Boniface Mwakibeta, 23rd July 1960, p.2.

subject fiercely debated in the local press across the 1950s.[61] In Lake Province, the testing ground for economic and political innovation in post-war Tanganyika, the task of enforcing the unpopular soil conservation measures which were a central part of the circumstances which led people to recast colonial rule, eroded whatever legitimacy local ethnic authorities had.[62] The story was similar in Upare in the north-east. There, soil erosion measures were introduced in 1951 and were initially accepted by the local population as part of a wider development initiative which also included a popular literacy drive in an area where demands for the better provision of education had long been audible. As the literacy campaign ground to a halt in 1952, however, and as responsibility for the soil conservation measures was passed to the Native Authority, assent for the measures withered and compulsion became an increasingly obvious part of the effort. By the late 1950s, a significant campaign was being waged in the area to undermine the position of local chiefs.[63] Reflecting on this, the district commissioner noted dolefully in his 1958 report that: 'The Pare continue to display on all possible occasions their suspicion of authority together with an alarmingly obvious disrespect for their Chiefs. Once again', he lamented, 'there has been [over the course of the year] the usual crop of "*fitina*" about the Chiefs.' 'The councillors', he sniffed:

… in general appear to have a misguided conception that they are the collective "Tribunes of the People", whose function is to criticise the Pare Council, and indeed authority as a whole, in everything it does, since the decisions of those in authority do not always coincide with those who are subject to authority. This is a curious psychological attitude and one which the writer has not met before among elected Local Authority Councils – a frame of mind in which the elected representatives consider themselves not in the positive role of initiators of matters for the public good, but rather in the negative role of "protectors" of the rights of the subject against higher authority, which, in the opinion of the councillors, must necessarily be wrong.[64]

Across Tanganyika, critics of chiefly authority continued to insist, as they had in the 1940s, on the need for educated leaders if the community was to prosper.[65] But, in the face of both colonial discussion of the need to democratise local government, and more immediately, the demands of the intrusive colonialism of the post-war period, a new emphasis was placed on the basis upon which

[61] Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', Ch.5.
[62] G.A. Maguire, *Towards Uhuru in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation* (Cambridge, 1969), Ch.2. Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development*, p.174. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p.189.
[63] Kimambo, *Penetration and Protest*, pp.121-6.
[64] TNA, 304 R/3/1, Pare District Annual Report 1958, pp.4-5.
[65] E.g. *Mwafrika*, Letter J.C. Patila, 30th May 1959, p.2.

those local authorities were established, and especially the need for 'democracy', the institution of elections.

The Hehe Democratic Union complained in early 1961, for example, that their chief considered Uhehe 'his property', and that as a consequence of this selfish and unpatriotic attitude the 'country was behind in *maendeleo*'; he served merely his own interest and not those of his subjects.[66] Credo Punyo, similarly, told of how chiefs built their regimes upon nepotism and oppressed their people by denying them their rights. It was the 'responsibility of we *raia* of Unyamwezi to elect our rulers', he argued, and he asked that the *Wanyamwezi* 'unite together shoulder to shoulder until we remove this disgrace' of unelected officials.[67] Mahashi M. Nibakenge insisted that chiefs saw their position as their property and so did not respect their *raia* or their aspirations. It followed that *maendeleo* was retarded.[68] And M. Mateso complained in *Mwafrika* in mid-1960 that the district of Songea was 'behind' in *maendeleo* because it was run by people who inherited their power. 'Although many people have education and likewise there is natural wealth and farmers perform diligently in the district', he argued, 'still the power of their government is under a few people'. The consequence was backwardness.[69] Unelected chiefs were understood to stand, then, as obstacles to prosperous ethnic communities (not national modernity).[70] Regular elections, these writers held, would make chiefs accountable to the people and more responsive to their needs, allowing the group to pursue their collective destiny unhindered by the greedy acquisitiveness of appointed leaders.[71]

The effects of unaccountable power on ethnic *maendeleo* were not, however, the sole focus of public debate as it touched on local democracy. A key part of these arguments concerned the configuration of a just and reputable society, the central theme in a flurry of letters which appeared in *Kiongozi* in late 1960 and early 1961 on chiefship in Unyamwezi. Beginning the debate, M.S.S.

[66] *Ngurumo*, 23rd January 1961, p.1.
[67] *Kiongozi*, Letter Credo Punyo, 15th December 1960, p.3.
[68] *Mwafrika*, Letter Mahashi M. Nibakenge, 26th March 1960, p. 2.
[69] *Mwafrika*, Letter M. Mateso, 4th June 1960, p.2.
[70] Contrast with Rathbone, *Nkrumah*, Introduction.
[71] For similar arguments on Kilimanjaro, see Hunter, *Political Thought*, p.175.

Mata explained that he wanted the *raia* to elect their chiefs, rather than allowing chiefs to inherit power within a single lineage, a custom which, he asserted, brought 'bitterness and shame'. In making this argument, he emphasised not the need for a new leadership to bring material development to their group, nor the damaging selfish individualism of existing leaders but, borrowing from Nyerere, the moral necessity of recognising the equal human dignity of all people. Unelected chiefs brought 'the destruction of the honour of the *raia*', he argued. He wanted, therefore, to 'examine the rights and honour of human beings' and to establish an 'Unyamwezi Democratic Party' to pursue these goods.[72] J.K. Yakale supported the formation of this party for the same reasons. The chiefs should no longer 'inherit we *raia* like slaves' he insisted in a telling phrase.[73] On this argument, the institution of elections, by allowing the people to choose for themselves their own leaders, would reflect the deeper moral principle of human equality, and in doing so establish the best basis for a civil society. National themes were, then, developed by local thinkers in their quest for civil, reputable and prosperous *ethnic* communities.

Despite the unpopularity of the measures associated with the second colonial occupation, and the role of chiefs in enforcing them, opinion was not set uniformly against 'traditional' rulers. Indeed, in 1959, William Madafu and H.M. Kiswagara called in *Kiongozi* for the creation of a *Wanyamwezi* 'paramount Chief'. Making his case, Kiswagara gave the example of the Chagga, who 'have got good *maendeleo*' and 'have been lauded in every place' under their paramount chief who had, moreover, along 'with the Chagga themselves' 'brought a good reputation to his country'.[74] It 'would be a thing of great benefit', Madafu explained, for the *Wanyamwezi* 'to join together and be under one leader', concluding by reminding his readers, consciously *quoting* a TANU slogan (itself in turn borrowed from the debates of the 1940s), that '"unity is strength and division is weakness"'.[75] A

[72] *Kiongozi*, Letter M.S.S. Mata, 1st November 1960, p.3.
[73] *Kiongozi*, Letter J.K. Yakale, 15th December 1960, p.3.
[74] *Kiongozi*, Letter H.M. Kiswagara, 1st May 1959, p.3.
[75] *Kiongozi*, Letter William Madafu, 16th March 1959, p.3. On TANU's use of this slogan see Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', p.210.

paramount chief would provide the leadership and focus that would best facilitate the quest for a civil, reputable and prosperous ethnic community.

Two years later, Hashim L. Ndambile expressed his concern with the arguments of Mata and his supporters on the need for democracy in Unyamwezi and defended the position of chiefs. While he did not oppose the creation of a Unyamwezi Democratic Party, he explained, he did oppose the aim of 'driv[ing] out our chiefs' and replacing them with elected leaders. The maintenance of the position of the country's 'original rulers', he argued, was not incompatible with 'democracy', as other nations in the world, and in particular Britain, with her young queen, demonstrated. It was, he went on, 'a great honour for the country to have its original rulers and tradition', and 'to drive out our original chiefs', replacing them with elected officials, would be 'a great dishonour for the *Wanyamwezi*'. The group's good name was bound up, he insisted, with their honouring this tradition, with keeping these leaders in place. Any party committed to bringing democracy should therefore, he argued, aim not at the removal of the chiefs, but simply at ensuring that the rights of the people were respected by the administration.[76] The second colonial occupation, then, did not wash away tribe, but deepened, intensified and added to longer-standing arguments about how to maintain civil, reputable and prosperous ethnic communities, drawing occasionally, indeed, upon ideas or slogans associated with the nationalist party. As ever, while disputants shared an overarching framework, precisely what constituted such a community continued to be the subject of fierce debate.

Confronted by the imperative to get rid of colonial rule and the obstacles it posed to the reputation and prosperity of the colonised people, from the mid-1950s, TANU attempted to make use of the energies that were so visible in Tanganyika's rural localities, to engage itself in these struggles, and to harness them, ultimately, to their wider effort to bring down colonial rule. To this end, they pragmatically sought to engage local opinion and to make local alliances without, as far as possible, alienating large swathes of opinion. The equivocation this demanded was especially

[76] *Kiongozi*, Letter Hashim L. Ndambile, 17th January 1961, p.3.

evident in their pre-independence policy towards chiefship. On the one hand, the party sought to make common cause with popular local efforts to promote 'democracy' in local government. A circular sent from head office to local TANU branches in March 1960, therefore, outlined the need for the party to fight for 'democracy' at the local level, as well as setting out their intention to place candidates in any such local elections.[77] On the other hand, TANU sought to avoid alienating sections of local opinion by setting themselves too firmly against chiefs. An editorial in *Sauti ya TANU* in June 1958, for example, argued that there was no necessary tension between chiefs and TANU: the two had different spheres of influence. While, therefore, 'There are Chiefs of Uhehe, Usukuma, Uha etc. There are in fact no Chiefs of Tanganyika', the piece concluded. Colonialism had established a new level of government, wider than any tribal group, at which the nationalists aimed. Their opponents were not the chiefs, they therefore argued, but the British.[78] The point was reiterated by Oscar Kambona, TANU's dynamic (and later controversial) Secretary-General, in mid-1960. Setting out TANU's plans for local government, he explained that 'chiefs will remain and will have a voice in controlling the country', but 'their work will depend on the *raia*' and a TANU government would prefer 'that the affairs of the district are controlled by the *wananchi* who shall be elected in democratic circumstances', a point echoed by Rashidi Kawawa in the October of the same year.[79] This ambivalence was not to last.

More generally, in their effort to harness local discontent to the cause of anti-colonial nationalism, in the 1950s TANU accepted the affiliation of ethnically based, organisations, such as the Chagga Democratic Union and the Meru Citizens Union, organisations which were often at the forefront of rural radicalism.[80] At the same time, they sought to counter the efforts made by the colonial administration to portray (and discredit) anti-colonial nationalism as a threat to ethnicity, to

[77] TNA, 246/A.6/14 (Associations: Tanganyika African National Union, General, 1958-1964), Letter TANU Territorial Headquarters to all TANU Provincial and District Secretaries, 12th March 1960.
[78] BNA, FCO 141/17798, (Tanganyika African National Union: Publications), *Sauti Ya TANU*, 23rd June 1958, pp.1-2.
[79] *Mwafrika*, 16th July 1960, p.3. *Tanganyika Standard*, 4th October 1960, p.3.
[80] On harnessing local discontent to the cause of anti-colonial nationalism, see Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, and Hunter, *Political Thought*, Ch.6.

avoid potential supporters feeling that an absolute choice had to be made between tribe and territorial nation, a dichotomy the administration of Sir Edward Twining hoped to make use of. '[T]he division of Tanganyika into a large number of geographically separated tribes', the Governor told the Secretary of State in May 1956, 'while it makes the abstract ideal of African nationalism no less emotionally appealing, does not make it easy for stranger busybodies to persuade a tribesman to part with his money.'[81] His administration, therefore, sought 'To canalise nationalism into local or tribal patriotism' as a means of combatting their self-declared enemies in TANU.[82] Publicly, however, TANU gave the argument short shrift. While 'Certain fools go about spreading the rumour that TANU intends to destroy the tribes', wrote the editor of the party's newspaper, dismissively, in the run-up to the 1958 Legislative Council elections, this was absolutely 'not true'.[83]

Twining's hope was, nonetheless, TANU's fear. The party's leadership was clear that no single tribe was big enough by itself to get rid of colonialism, that colonialism was wider than any particular ethnic group.[84] If, therefore, the colonialists were to be thrown out and, moreover, people were to maintain a postcolonial life free from external subversion, they required the co-operation of many ethnic groups.[85] As the editors of *Mwafrika* told their readers in the build up to the September 1958 Legislative Council elections, in their fight against colonialism the people had no 'weapon except UNITY'.[86] Lawi Sijaona, a member of the Legislative Council, made the same point when he told a parable of two African villages in Southern Province which for years blamed each other for fouling the water of a communal well, before eventually discovering that all along the culprit had been the 'Lebioto' bird. Having made this discovery, the people of the two villages joined together

[81] BNA, CO 822/859, Extract of a letter from the Governor of Tanganyika to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2nd May 1956, p.1.
[82] BNA, CO 822/859, Letter from the Governor of Tanganyika to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31st October 1955, p.4. See also Geiger, *TANU Women*, pp.106-7 and Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', p.187.
[83] BNA, FCO 141/17798, *Sauti Ya TANU*, 24th April 1958, pp.2-3.
[84] BNA, FCO 141/17798, *Sauti Ya TANU*, 23rd June 1958, pp.1-2.
[85] BNA, FCO 141/17747, Southern Highlands Province Weekly Intelligence Memorandum No.14, Appendix A, p.1.
[86] *Mwafrika*, 1st June 1958, p.5. Original emphasis.

and collectively drove the menace away. '[P]eace then ensued.'[87] Unity was strength and division weakness. The party's leadership feared that ethnic differences would undermine this sense of common purpose, a fear expressed by Julius Nyerere when he told the UNO in 1955 that 'It has been said – and this is quite right – that Tanganyika is tribal' and that this 'tribal consciousness' needed to be transcended. It was an 'objective of the Union [i.e. TANU]', he made clear, 'to build up a national consciousness among the African peoples in Tanganyika.'[88] The same assumptions lay behind his description of the intimate engagement of Soloman Eliufoo, a TANU member of the Legislative Council, in local struggles on Kilimanjaro over the position of the *Mangi Mkuu* as 'embarrassing' in a private conversation with the new governor, Richard Turnbull, in 1959. The policy of the Tanganyika Elected Members Organisation, TANU members of the Legislative Council, he made clear, was not 'to interfere in *tribal politics*.'[89] To maintain the sense of common purpose their predicament required, Nyerere argued, ethnic divisions had to be avoided, and above all the party and its leadership must set an example in this, holding themselves above any suspicion of ethnic particularity.

While, therefore, TANU's predecessor, the Tanganyika African Association, had told the Constitutional Development Committee in 1950 of their expectation that Tanganyika would develop as a federal unit, building upon the cultural similarities of ethnic groups, in these new circumstances, sensing that the need for freedom was desperate and fearing the dangers of division, TANU's leadership abandoned this image. Even, therefore, as they pragmatically accepted the affiliation of ethnic organisations, TANU's leadership, insisted, their gaze guided to the territorial unit by the concrete structures of the state, that Tanganyika was more than the mere collection of tribes. Drawing on a model of community that was by this stage well embedded in imaginations across the territory, they presented Tanganyika as a foundational nation, and, in a novel move, insisted that

[87] BNA, FCO 141/17761 (Tanganyika African National Union in Northern Province), Post-Election Committee, Activities of TANU Representatives in the Northern Province, 25th July 1959, p.1.
[88] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, pp.38-9.
[89] BNA, FCO 141/17747, R.G. Turnbull's Notes on Meeting with Nyerere, 12th June 1959, p.2. My emphasis. On Eliufoo and his local politics see Hunter, *Political Thought*, Ch.6.

this national community must be prioritised over ethnic particularity. 'What', Nyerere asked, giving expression to this understanding, 'is this Tanganyika we are talking about?' Answering his own question, he tellingly asserted that the 'nationalist movement' in the territory was not built upon 'a tribal association which began to swallow other tribes', but, rather, transcended tribal divisions, to be truly national, reflecting the oneness of the territory and its people.[90] TANU's president might have feared that the people of Tanganyika were tribal in their outlook, but schooled in the arguments and images of the previous two decades he reached easily for the image of a foundational territorial community, a community consisting of people typically referred to in this period as the *Watanganyika*, a linguistic development that reflected the increasing centrality of this community in people's minds, as thinkers engaged with and reworked the pluralism which had characterised the previous decade. It was time, so ran the lyrics of a popular TANU hymn - 'May God Bless Tanganyika' - to 'all unite/ Let us be *Watanganyika*'.[91]

Over time, TANU's stress upon this image, their insistence that people prioritise their bond as *Watanganyika* over ethnic affinities, like the use of the term *Watanganyika* itself, hardened. As the territory moved towards self-government and independence, following their overwhelming victories in the Legislative Council elections of September 1958 and February 1959, and Governor Turnbull's announcement in December 1959 that internal self-government would be granted the next year, and against the background of bloody ethnic conflict in the Congo, violence which haunted imaginations across the region, the party's fears about the dangers of ethnic division deepened. It was against this background in 1960, that the party reversed its earlier position on ethnic affiliation, rejecting the ethnic organisations which had been its key allies in the first half decade of its existence, insisting that it knew only *Watanganyika*.[92] As Lucy Lameck told the National

[90] *Tanganyika Standard*, 20th March 1959, pp.1-2.
[91] BNA, FCO 141/17798, 'TANU Hymns, Appendix A and B'.
[92] Eckert, 'Useful Instruments', p.109.

Assembly on the eve of independence in 1961, 'It was important that the people's first loyalty was to the country not to the tribe or locality.'[93]

The demanding emphasis that was placed by the nationalist leadership upon the need for national unity, the insistence that people prioritise loyalty to Tanganyika over all other allegiances, in turn, raised questions about the demands that unity bred, questions to some extent familiar from 1940s Kenya, but little heard in the Tanganyika of that decade, and the consequences of these demands. In short, questions about how various imaginations of community fitted together. Some people questioned the propriety of raising up this national bond and emphasised the priority of ethnic obligations. Bakari son of Mlela, for example, giving expression to a worry hinted at in certain submissions made to the East African Royal Commission, wrote in *Kiongozi* in 1960 on tensions over access to land in north-eastern Tanganyika where conflict between people who claimed local roots and migrants who came to work on the sisal plantations had long been evident. Addressing the issue of movement across the territory, he expressed disappointment that Africans who went to the coast to find work did not, apparently, routinely return to their place of origin. He developed his argument by suggesting that people from the interior were discriminated against by local rulers, and concluded, on the basis of a combination of 'settler' obligation and self-interest, that Africans from up-country 'should remember to return to our homes'.[94] He questioned, that is, the emphasis that was being placed on the nation.

Others asked questions about the consequences of the prioritising of their bond as *Watanganyika*. Charles Augustin, for example, writing in *Kiongozi* in 1957, criticised the people of Kondoa's willingness to allow their children to marry people from outside the local area, people of whose background (and baptism) they knew nothing. He went on to cast doubt on the moral fibre of the incomers, suggesting that their interest in marrying in Kondoa was a product of the area's relatively low bridewealth prices, implying that these youths were too lazy to perform the virtuous labour that would allow them to marry at their own home. In conclusion, he firmly expressed his

[93] *Tanganyika Standard*, 12th October 1961, p.5.
[94] *Kiongozi*, Letter Bakari s/o Mlela, 15th March 1960, p.3.

belief that such marriages should not be allowed to be made.[95] L.H. Lubuva Sitakaifujo agreed with the sentiment, telling the Warangi, his ethnic group, that 'your children are not to be married to strangers, because it is to abuse kinship.'[96]

Mwalimu A.A. Namikowi, more directly making reference to the wider demand for national unity, made a similar argument in a letter written to *Kiongozi* almost two years later. He held that marriage between members of different ethnic groups was not desirable, even if it was made with 'my fellow *Mtanganyika*', and gave three reasons in support of his argument. Firstly, he explained, he did not want his children to be called '*machotara*', or of a mixed background; secondly, he worried that the marriage itself would be bad; and finally, he expressed concern that his elders would not be happy that a wife from another tribe would be unacquainted with local customs, and therefore unable to fully share in the task of building a happy and productive household, and so an esteemed life. Mixed marriages, in short, threatened to disrupt the life of the household, the presumed basis of civilisation.[97] He concluded that a man should, therefore, marry a woman of his own tribe. For these writers, tribe and nation were qualitatively different communities. To them, a national unity unmediated by tribe appeared to threaten the quality and stability of the households which underpinned civilisation, and by implication, the wider world with the prospect of descent into anarchic immorality, the direct product of the loss of local control, the effective dissolution of reputation.[98] Tribe, on this view, *had* to be the basis of any wider community.

The nationalist's vision of unity, as Namikowi implied, could also be seen to threaten the future of valuable and distinctive ethnic customs and traditions, and by extension the existence of ethnic groups themselves. This was the particular concern of two Roman Catholic Bishops, L. Rugambua and E.A. Maranta, who worried in a pamphlet published in December 1960, and originally delivered the previous September, 'on the occasion of the beginning of responsible government in Tanganyika', about the dangers of the crushing uniformity implied by the nationalist emphasis on

[95] *Kiongozi*, Letter Charles Augustin, December 1957, p.2.
[96] *Kiongozi*, Letter L.H. Lubuva Sitakaifujo, 16th January 1958, p.2.
[97] *Kiongozi*, Letter Mwl. A.A. Namikowi, 1st September 1959, p.3.
[98] See also Lonsdale, 'Authority, Gender and Violence'.

unity. Ironically picking up upon TANU's nationalist slogan, 'Freedom and Unity', they discoursed on 'Unity and Freedom', 'the duty of collaboration in freedom', and sought to 'present the clergy, religious and laity with some directive as to the role Catholics have to play in the new Tanganyika which is being born'.[99] In the first place, they worried that TANU's emphasis on unity left little space for dissent and freedom of conscience. They were concerned with 'the harmonious linking of the unity [sic] and freedom', which was to say that 'the unity of … citizens in a concerted effort for the common good' should be properly constructed to respect 'the essential freedom of the human person, deriving from the free will which distinguishes man from all other earthly creatures.'[100] Unity had to be formulated in such a way as to allow space for individual conscience.

In the second place, the two bishops worried that the emphasis placed upon the need for unity by the nationalist bloc would crush the legitimate 'pluralism' of Tanganyika. They located 'the understanding of the principles underlying this collaboration in freedom' as depending 'largely on accepting the fact that human society all the world over, and particularly in Tanganyika, is a pluralistic society in which men of different creeds, different ideologies, different political ideas, different ethnic, social and cultural backgrounds live together and must strive to collaborate harmoniously.'[101] Respecting the pluralism of society meant, among other things, recognising 'that different political groups have the right to existence in any society or state', that 'the social services such as education, social security, medico-social assistance, community development and so forth, should not fall under the exclusive domain of the State', both necessary guards against 'totalitarianism', and accepting religious pluralism.[102] Most relevantly here, it also meant recognising ethnic pluralism within Tanganyika.

There were 'principles in the natural law', the bishops held, 'which can help us solve the problem arising from the living together of different nationalities race and tribes.' They were clear that in the new Tanganyika 'the essential equality and dignity of all human beings' must be

[99] L. Rugambua and E.A. Maranta, *Unity and Freedom in the New Tanganyika* (Tabora, 1960), p.2, p.31.
[100] *Ibid*, pp.2-3.
[101] *Ibid*, p.3.
[102] *Ibid*, p.9, pp.10-11, pp.15-20.

acknowledged and acted upon by guaranteeing 'the same human and civil rights… to each and every member of every' ethnic, and indeed minority national or racial, group, the subject of the following section. But they were equally insistent that ethnic, or again minority national or racial groups, 'have some right to continued existence' as 'distinct' groups, 'for instance in preserving their distinctive tribal or racial customs or traits, their language, and, in general, all the ethnic characteristics which constitute a valuable part of the social patrimony of mankind. Any effort to drive them to extinction as an ethnic group', they went on, 'in the cause of uniformity, or to prohibit or destroy their customs, language and so forth, would not only be inexpedient', but 'wrong and condemnable in light of the natural law'.[103] Unity, they insisted, had to recognise and respect, not crush, diversity.

The arguments of the bishops, however, stood conspicuously alone in this period. Unlike in Kenya of the 1960s, as we shall see in the next chapter, people in Tanganyika did not *agonise* over the construction of national unity, or TANU's strikingly uniform vision of it, nor were doubts turned into constitutional theory or plans. Rather, to an audience armed, like the nationalist politicians and the press, with an established image of a foundational community of *Watanganyika*, a single moral unit, and which now popularly rejected colonialism as an impediment to their collective flourishing, the arguments of TANU and the wider nationalist bloc proved popular, and calls to promote national loyalty over all others raised strikingly few questions.

In Kenya, where tribe was firmly established in the 1940s as man's basic community and the necessary basis of any wider community, the recasting of colonial rule in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the calls to unity beyond the ethnic group which accompanied this, sharpened difficult questions about how that unity could, or should, be constructed, and about the consequences of various constructions. Loud and popular demands were made that diversity was recognised, and worries aired about the nature and basis of power, and the implications of this for the *maendeleo* of the various peoples of the territory, as we shall see in the next chapter. In Tanganyika, by contrast, the established image people shared with their (almost) rulers of Tanganyika as a single nation held

[103] *Ibid*, pp.6-7.

such questions at bay. 'Tanganyika is ours', wrote F.M. Marenge outlining the underlying image, 'it is our country, it was given to us by our Lord'.[104] '[A]ll people in Tanganyika have joined together and are one nation which is being called *Watanganyika*,' Saidi M. Mavuno similarly claimed.[105] The *Watanganyika*, wrote Alexander Mugonya, had 'one father, God', and 'one mother – TANGANYIKA'.[106] And the pseudonymous '*Mtanganyika*' emphasised the same understanding when he reminded his readers that 'today we are *Watanganyika*. We are of one lineage and our country is one only: "Tanganyika"'.[107] Tanganyika was, thus, understood to be a single moral unit to which people owed moral obligations. Power, it followed, was neither foreign, nor unaccountable, and, therefore, likely to serve all equally regardless of their ethnic background. In these circumstances, Twining's strategy of 'divide and rule' failed.

In this process, moreover, visions of Tanganyika as something other than a unitary state were elbowed aside. While, therefore, in the 1940s and early 1950s, organisations such as the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union, the Buhaya Union and the Tanganyika African Association had given thought to the question of how to join Tanganyika's localities together, how to link ethnic groups to a shared centre, building upon ethnic particularity, questions underpinning an image of ethnic federation, an image still being mooted by thinkers in north-eastern Tanganyika in the mid-1950s, by the end of the decade such questions and images were notable by their absence.[108] As an image of a shared community of *Watanganyika* was reinforced by the imperative to independence, such pluralist visions lost whatever purchase they had once had, the questions they answered apparently without immediate relevance, and seemingly now more likely to breed division than bring unity. Even, then, as people concerned themselves with the need for strong and reformed ethnic government, a task central to the maintenance of civil reputable and prosperous ethnic

[104] *Kiongozi*, Letter F.M. Marenge, 14th June 1959, p.3.
[105] *Mwafrika*, Letter Saidi M. Mavuno, 25th June 1960, p.2.
[106] *Kiongozi*, *Uhuru Na Haki Tu?*, 15th February, 1960, p.7. Original emphasis.
[107] *Kiongozi*, Letter "*Mtanganyika*", March 1957, p.4.
[108] On Chagga and Shambaa thinking, see Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, pp.210-12 and Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', p.191.

communities, the question of how to link these units to a shared centre disappeared. Tribe would have no bearing on national identity.

This emphasis on national unity was not popularly understood to mean the death of honourable ethnic groups. Indeed, as we have seen, people self-consciously borrowed TANU's language and imagery in their quest for civil, reputable and prosperous tribal communities. The tribe did not have to die for the nation to live. But people now recognised that they must not allow their ethnic allegiances to sour relations between *Watanganyika*. As '*Mtanganyika*' put it, 'Your tribe waits for you' in the post-independence future; it would not be lost or destroyed. But 'now', he was clear, was 'the time to be mature', to finish 'the *maendeleo* of your country', to act as *Watanganyika*.[109]

In Tanganyika, then, it was the dangers of division, not the dangers associated with national unity, which stalked public debate. On the topic of marriage, for example, J.K. Kiimbila, scolded Namikowi. Referring explicitly to both ethnicity and more controversially race, he explained that in the modern world, social background was irrelevant to marriage which, he argued, should, rather, be built upon love. He reminded his adversary that 'In the present world people of different tribes are able to live together', and that 'matters of tribalism have finished in other areas of Tanganyika', and by extension should do in this area, too.[110] It was not acceptable, even in marriage to divide the *Watanganyika* along ethnic lines.

Correspondents in the press, likewise, rejected the idea that movement across the territory and access to land should be limited by tribe, a marked contrast, as we will see, with the ideas of the supporters of both KANU and KADU. One correspondent, for example, criticised the arguments of Bakari son of Mlela on the movement of people across Tanganyika. He complained that the thoughts expressed were 'able to bring treachery in certain things which are important for *Watanganyika*'; they destroyed love, segregated the people, and encouraged discrimination between the tribes of the country. The original letter, he went on, showed the 'scorn of the people of the Coast together

[109] *Kiongozi*, Letter "*Mtanganyika*", March 1957, p.4.
[110] *Kiongozi*, Letter J.K. Kiimbila, 1st October 1959, p.3.

with the *wazee* of the *barazas* who do not respect their fellow African settlers who are *Watanganyika*.'[111] And H.H. Kalunga, reacting to the same letter, explained that he was 'disappointed that you hate your fellow *wananchi* without reason by calling them "foreigners" and "settlers".' People should remember, he argued, that 'Tanganyika is our home', and not merely a particular ethnic enclave within it. The *Watanganyika* should not be confined to any one part of the territory, but rather had the right to live where they wanted within the territory.[112] Like Nyerere, these writers held that Tanganyika belonged to all the *Watanganyika* and not to particular tribes.[113] Tanganyika was one country and its people one. The equal treatment and equal rights of all *Watanganyika* had to be held above any ethnic particularity.

The imaginative work of the earlier period, then, the established image of a foundational Tanganyikan community, now widely referred to as the *Watanganyika*, both provided the basis of the imagination of community in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and was, in turn, reinforced by the imperative of independence. In this process, a discursive context was established in which it was, in marked contrast to Kenya, all but impossible to be seen to prioritise ethnic loyalty over national loyalty. When rumours circulated in 1960, therefore, that the Masai 'were longing to leave Tanganyika and to join with the Masai of Kenya at the time this country is free' *Laibon* Merishari Oroma, as representative of the Masai, was forced make a denial of the rumor in front of a reported crowd of 20,000 people at a TANU meeting in Dar es Salaam. 'These words', according to newspaper reports, had 'brought *Laibon* Oroma up to Dar es Salaam to meet with the head of TANU', where in his speech he made clear 'that the Masai did not want to seperate themselves from the other tribes of Tanganyika, and that they *trusted Bwana* Nyerere.'[114] The intellectual space which had marked the 1940s was being decisively shrunk.

The need for unity to push out the colonialists and to ensure a happy independence led thinkers in Tanganyika to promote a national allegiance over ethnic allegiances. Unity as

[111] *Kiongozi*, Letter Michael L.I., 1st May 1960, p.3.
[112] *Kiongozi*, Letter H.H. Kalunga, 1st May 1960, p.3.
[113] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, pp.57-8.
[114] *Mwafrika*, 9th April 1960, p.6. My emphasis.

Watanganyika was not, however, the only model of pan-ethnic unity available to the people of Tanganyika. As we saw in the previous chapter, a vision of a continentally bound, racially defined community of Africans was also widely invoked and debated in the earlier period. In the quest for independence, however, this vision, too, was subordinated to the national community.

Again, this is not to say that these connections, or this particular form of community, were forgotten. An understanding of a racially defined, continentally bound, community of descent, and a concern with its flourishing, continued to feature prominently in public discourse in this period. The editors of *Kiongozi*, to take only one very brief case, noted, for example, echoing Martin Kayamba, that the issue of bridewealth, which on alternate arguments either promoted or inhibited the development of disciplined households, and its reform was a 'plan' that had 'perplexed not only us here in Tanganyika on our own, but Africans of other countries too'.[115] The payment of the fee was an African custom, intimately connected to concerns about civility and reputation, shared across the continent, and the reform of which concerned, they held, in general terms, all African people.

The emphasis on the connection and obligations that linked Africans familiar from the 1940s was most vividly displayed in the criticism made of the Citizenship Bill introduced in October 1961, concerning the absence of provision for Africans from non-Commonwealth countries to become citizens, an issue which had implications for both the character of Tanganyika, a matter taken up in the next section, and for Tanganyika's relationship with the rest of the continent. Lucy Lameck, amongst others, 'criticised the provision in the paper whereby Commonwealth citizens could', by virtue of proposed reciprocal transfers of citizenship, 'become Tanganyikans more easily than aliens', among whom were numbered 'Africans who, because of some "historical circumstances"', which is to say the vagaries of colonial conquest, 'were not in the Commonwealth'. She insisted that this anomaly was rectified by making equivalent citizenship provisions for all Africans, irrespective of their colonial background, thereby recognising the bond shared by all Africans.[116] Others, indeed,

[115] *Kiongozi*, 1st April 1960, p.4.
[116] *Tanganyika Standard*, 12th October 1961, p.5.

went further, disavowing membership of the Commonwealth as an impediment to African unity.[117] While the TANU-government remained committed to Commonwealth membership, it accepted both the demand that some provision be made for non-Commonwealth Africans and the reasoning behind the demand, amending the Bill to allow Africans of any country to become citizens of Tanganyika, 'show[ing] the world', in the words of George Kahama, the Minister for Home Affairs, that 'Tanganyika is an African country', and, importantly, reflecting the 'love' of the *Watanganyika* 'for our [African] brothers in other countries'.[118]

As the iniquities of colonial rule and the need for a sustainable independence became increasingly prominent topics of conversation in the 1950s and 1960s, the logic of building weighty units the better, in particular, to withstand postcolonial subversion was applied to a unit beyond Tanganyika. 'Large units are an advantage both politically and economically' wrote George S. Magombe in a 1961 letter to the *Tanganyika Standard*, and therefore 'The idea of federating the East African countries is a noble one.'[119] The same idea came to animate Julius Nyerere. He told the BBC's Panorama programme in January 1960 that 'Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda should eventually join together in a Federation', although, at this stage, he added the caveat that 'How soon that happens depends upon the people'.[120] By mid-June, he was less equivocal. Speaking at a Pan-African conference in Ethiopia, he claimed his audience knew that 'even after our Independence has been achieved[,] that "African Personality" which we would build up will depend upon the consolidation of our unity', that a 'balkanised Africa' would be 'easy prey to the forces of neo-imperialism', and that 'The weak and divided can never hope to maintain a Dignified Independence'. He concluded, therefore, that a 'Dignified African Personality requires actual unity and not [merely] a sentimental desire to be united.' If the humanity of Africans was to be recognised, then the African people needed to create a concrete unity with which to face the world. It followed, he went on, that 'the

[117] R. Aminzade, *Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 76-7.
[118] *Ngurumo*, 2nd December 1961, p.1.
[119] *Tanganyika Standard*, Letter George S. Magombe, 11th September 1961, p.2.
[120] *Tanganyika Standard*, 6th January 1960, p.1.

time' to bring about unity beyond the confines of colonial territories 'is NOW and the method is to COMBINE THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT AND THE UNITY MOVEMENT INTO ONE AND THE SAME THING SO THAT BOTH FREEDOM AND UNITY ARE ACHIEVED AT THE SAME TIME'. He wanted 'the freedom of East Africa as ONE POLITICAL UNIT', a prospect which would, given the different constitutional stages reached on the path to independence in these territories, require Tanganyika to agree to delay her independence to allow the other territories to catch up, a price Nyerere thought worth paying.[121] If a successful and true independence was to be achieved in Africa, and for the African people, then a unity wider than the territory of the colonial state was necessary.

Nyerere's proposals, however, met with a notably muted response in Tanganyika (and, indeed, were quickly disowned by TANU's National Executive Committee[122]) a silence in which the independence of Tanganyika, and the *Watanganyika*, was implicitly prioritised over the independence of Africa and Africans more generally. A letter published in *Kiongozi* hinted at the reasons why. *Uhuru*, the writer argued in the first place, was a right which should be gained as quickly as possible: a rapid independence should not be easily surrendered. More importantly, he went on, the *uhuru* of Tanganyika was close precisely as a consequence of the 'unity and peace' the *Watanganyika* had shown over the previous decade. 'We would be deceived', he concluded, 'to wait for people' in the other territories of East Africa 'who do not have unity and who', in some cases, 'do not respect peace', an unsubtle reference to Mau Mau, 'since we do not know when they will be ready'. The people of Tanganyika, he held, had *earned* their position by 'their sweat and unity and peace'; it was up to other people in other territories to do the same.[123]

As thinkers recast the potential of colonial rule, then, the structure of the state directed imaginations to the territorial level, while, the subsequent efforts they made in their quest for independence, led the *Watanganyika* to prioritise their obligations to Tanganyika over not only

[121] BNA, CO 822/2232, (East Africa. Original Correspondence. Federation of East African Territories), Statement made by The Hon. Dr. Nyerere M.L.C., the President of the Tanganyika African National Union, to the Conference of Independent African States at Addis Ababa, 2nd Session, 14-24th June 1960, pp.1-2. Original emphasis.
[122] Aminzade, *Race, Nation, and Citizenship*, p.78.
[123] *Kiongozi*, Letter "*Mwenye Wasiwasi*", 13th September 1960, p.3.

ethnic loyalties, but obligations to a wider African community. Other people must, it was held, similarly help themselves. The concept and significance of race as an organising principle for community was itself, however, also coming under pressure in this period. Despite the obvious continuities in language with the previous decade, for Nyerere, the significance of race was not existentialist, a God-given bond, as had commonly been argued in the 1940s, but utilitarian. It was on these grounds that he repeatedly made reference to the continued oppression of parts of the continent, and in particular in South Africa. Apartheid, he asserted, was both an affront to the 'belief in individual human dignity' and, moreover, 'a constantly reiterated insult to our dignity as Africans', and 'about which', therefore, Africans 'cannot be expected to remain indifferent'.[124] If colonialism, and the racism which underpinned it, were not fully removed, then the battle for the recognition of the humanity of Africans, the primary purpose in Nyerere's eyes of independence, was not won. This revised understanding of race was central to developing arguments over the nature and basis of citizenship in Tanganyika, the topic to which we must now turn.

[124] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, p.109.

IV

Race relations in 1950s Tanganyika, and in particular in Dar es Salaam, were tense, the place of non-Africans in the territory an important element in public argument and public performance, as the recent work of James Brennan has shown. In the late 1950s, for example, members of the TANU Youth League, 'exercised occasional "vigilante" police powers… in order to shape national spaces in ways that honoured popular racial sensibilities', while the *duka*, where goods desired by large swathes of the African population were both on view and out of reach, became 'a site increasingly fraught with racial tension', the occasional scene of violence as African crowds confronted 'broadly Asian shopkeepers'.[125] The colonial government's declared policy of multi-racialism and the growing prospect of independence, moreover, led African politicians and thinkers to give further thought to the question of the proper place of non-Africans in Tanganyika and, increasingly, in an independent Tanganyika, and by extension to the character of the country. As we shall see, even as people continued to assert an on-going relationship with the continent of Africa as a whole, the Africanness of the people of Tanganyika was being called into question.

The Citizenship Bill introduced by Nyerere's government in the National Assembly in October 1961 proved to be a lightning rod for discussion on this topic, not its origin, but a focus for concerted thinking. As it was first presented, the Bill offered automatic citizenship to British Protected Persons and Citizens of the United Kingdom born in Tanganyika who had one parent born there, or British Protected Persons and Citizens of the United Kingdom born outside Tanganyika but whose parents would be entitled to citizenship on the first criteria. Registration or naturalisation as citizens was then offered to women married to men entitled to Tanganyikan citizenship, and to British Protected Persons or citizens of the United Kingdom born in Tanganyika but whose parents were not. Finally, citizenship would be offered on a reciprocal basis to citizens of other Commonwealth countries, a clause which, as we saw above, was modified in later versions to include the possibility of citizenship

[125] Brennan, *Taifa*, pp.148-53.

for Africans of non-Commonwealth countries. All, however, would have to give up citizenship of any other country: dual citizenship would not be tolerated. Those people who found themselves with a choice of citizenships would, according to the terms of the Bill, be given a two-year period in which to make their decision about which they wanted to take.[126] Controversially, as we shall see, these provisions held out the prospect of non-African citizenship and put the decision as to whether citizenship was to be taken in non-African hands.

In the 1940s, the *Watanganyika* were explicitly constructed as a racial group, an off-shoot of a wider continental African community. The group was linked by an imperial connection to people of other races, white and Asian, but those groups were held to be foreign, external to the *Watanganyika*. Drawing on these ideas, many thinkers insisted in the late 1950s and early 1960s, that citizenship of an independent Tanganyika must be confined to Africans. With the severing of the imperial connection, they held, the country of Tanganyika would *remain* African, and *revert* to African control. Other racial groups within the territory, who had always been foreign, would remain so. Political status would reflect and sanctify an existing community of descent. This was not necessarily the same as suggesting that foreign groups should be removed from Tanganyika (although rumours of threats being made to Indians and Europeans about their post-independence fates persisted), merely that they should be accorded a status which acknowledged their foreignness.[127] Citizenship would be reserved for those who had always been, by virtue of descent, *Watanganyika*.

A citizenship so conceived was the cornerstone policy of the African National Congress (ANC), a political party formed in early 1958 as breakaway group from TANU following the decision by the party's leadership to participate in the tri-partite Legislative Council elections of that year, a

[126] *Tanganyika Standard*, 12th October 1961, p.1. This Act remained the basis of Tanzania's citizenship laws until it was superseded by a new Act in 1995, on which see Aminzade, *Race, Nation and Citizenship*, pp.302-3.
[127] E.g. *Mwafrika*, Letter R.G. Siwale, 16th June 1958, p.2. On threats see: Aminzade, *Race, Nation and Citizenship*, p.74. BNA, CO 822/2044, (Speeches on Policy by Mr Nyerere, 1960-2), Telegram from Tanganyika Information Office to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13th August 1960. BNA, CO 822/2044, Press Release: New Government Will Help Those Who Help Themselves, 16th August 1960, p.1. *Kiongozi,* Letter Epimaki Martin, 16th March 1956, p.3. *Kiongozi*, Letter Barnaba A. Mpangala, 12th April 1959, p.3. *Kiongozi*, Letter "*Bwana Kijana Mtanganyika*", 12th April 1959, p.3.

decision which its critics took to be a denial of the African character of Tanganyika and an illegitimate assertion of the multi-racial character of the territory.[128] Developing this theme, the ANC's leader, Zuberi Mtemvu, contrasted an 'African' nation with a '*mseto*' nation, a word literally meaning 'mixed', but which in the context of early 1960s Tanganyika recalled the multi-racial plans of the Twining government, and which was used by the ANC to condemn TANU's officially non-racial vision of Tanganyika, discussed below.[129] 'We want to build an African nation', Mtemvu made clear, an approach he contrasted with that of TANU, which he claimed, critically, was aimed at 'Preparing the Africans, Indians, Arabs and Whites of Tanganyika to rule themselves. Not the African alone.'[130] The nation of the *Watanganyika*, he insisted, was necessarily African and citizenship provisions should reflect this.

These ideas were certainly not confined to the ANC, however.[131] 'Almighty God', wrote R.G. Siwale in *Mwafrika*, had divided the world, made clear 'that all the people in the world were equal before me', and decreed that 'every nation [*taifa*] and its country [*nchi*]', should be ruled by its own people not others. The 'Africans of Tanganyika' he went on, therefore, 'want the responsibility of ruling themselves' precisely 'to show their *ustaarabu*', that they were equal with other people 'following the instructions of God.'[132] Alfons Mpiluka, writing in *Kiongozi*, argued on the same basis that 'All leaders of the [independent] Government should be our fellow Africans', and announced his expectation that most non-Africans would return to the countries from which they originated following independence.[133] Responding in late 1960 to statements apparently made by Government ministers on the future of non-African minorities in an independent Tanganyika, Charles Mugambi argued that 'All Africans believed that since TANU was begun it wanted to get for the *wananchi* their country [so] that they should rule it, and that Whites, Arabs and Asians will be counted as foreigners

[128] J. Brennan, 'The Short History of Political Opposition and Multi-Party Democracy in Tanganyika, 1958-64', in G.H. Maddox and J.L. Giblin, *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania* (Oxford, 2005), pp.251-76.
[129] See Brennan, *Taifa*, pp.153-57.
[130] *Ngurumo*, 5th December 1960, p.1. *Kiongozi*, 17th October 1959, p.1.
[131] Brennan, 'Short History', p.259.
[132] *Mwafrika*, Letter R.G. Siwale, 16th June 1958, p.2.
[133] *Kiongozi*, Letter Alfons Mpiluka, 16th February 1959, p.3.

only', and not, therefore, as equal citizens.[134] And S.M. Kalason, reacting in *Ngurumo* to the introduction of the Citizenship Bill in the National Assembly, argued similarly that 'TANU was begun for wanting the *UHURU* of the *Watanganyika* (Africans)'. Like Mtemvu, he drew a contrast between this idea and that of the colonial government-sponsored United Tanganyika Party (UTP), which, he held, 'was invented with the objective of wanting multi-racialism in this country of Tanganyika', and which, he said, had been 'controlled by rich people with property (Indians and Whites)'. The provisions of the government's Citizenship Bill, he complained, showed that TANU's original aims had been betrayed by their leadership. If TANU was now allowing for, or even encouraging, non-African citizenship, what was the difference, he asked, between TANU and the hated UTP?[135] A racial basis for citizenship, these writers felt, would reflect African 'ownership' of the country, and would maintain the African character, the distinctive identity, of the *Watanganyika*, an emphasis reflected in the complaints made in the National Assembly, noted above, that non-Commonwealth Africans had been excluded from the possibility of citizenship.[136] To recognise the connection of these Africans to Tanganyika was to assert the racial character of the nation.

This emphasis was supplemented by a further moral concern. While in the 1940s, colonialism had been understood as being potentially a force for good, immigrant communities, White and Asian, had long been the most controversial aspect of the colonial link, sectional groups which threatened the paramountcy of African interests, their increasing numbers evidence that Livingstone's successors had lost their sense of historic mission. In the 1950s, as colonialism was recast as inherently exploitative, this sense hardened. Independence raised questions about whether or not it was right to allow people who were seen to have willingly and knowingly exploited, or perhaps merely stood by and watched the exploitation of the African population of Tanganyika, equal status with their victims. As R.S. Wambura asked in the National Assembly during the debates on the Citizenship Bill, was it correct that 'people who had been in the country for

[134] *Ngurumo*, Letter Charles Mugambi, 5th December 1960, p.2.
[135] *Ngurumo*, Letter S.M. Kalason, 26th October 1961, p.2.
[136] See *Tanganyika Standard*, 12th October 1961, p.5.

centuries and had not made up their minds' should now 'be treated as an African and an equal'?[137] The earlier alleged actions, or absence of moral action, of racial minorities, he implied, should exclude them from the privileges of citizenship.

Proponents of an African-only citizenship, relatedly, worried about the possibility of future exploitation, and therefore about the prospects of *maendeleo* in the country. Again, in the first place, this argument drew on a longstanding scepticism of the motives of immigrant communities in Tanganyika, and the assumption that these groups served their own narrow racial interests, exploiting the African population to line their own pockets. History suggested they could not be trusted. This was underpinned, in turn, by a deeper (and by now familiar) argument, that men and women were bound by an involuntary obligation, a moral imperative, to serve the community into which they were born. The loyalty of non-Africans was, it was therefore assumed, to their racial community of descent. This being the case, African thinkers in Tanganyika worried that non-Africans would act as a fifth column in the independent nation, engaging in the on-going exploitation of the African majority. Christopher Tumbo, for example, the most prominent and outspoken opponent of the Citizenship Bill, loudly made this argument. Africans, he insisted, had been slapped once, and would not agree to be slapped a second time.[138] The fruits of a hard-won independence could not be compromised by a misplaced sense of obligation to members of other races. On this further basis, they held, therefore, that citizenship and political rights should be accorded only to Africans, leaving them in control of the destiny of non-Africans in the country.

This understanding was widespread in the Tanganyika of the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was, however, challenged, and in turn, often modified by a moral argument directed against any kind of discrimination based on race, an argument most closely associated with Julius Nyerere.[139]

Surprisingly, perhaps, the president of TANU shared an obvious common intellectual inheritance with Tumbo and his supporters. Drawing on the intellectual work of the 1940s, he

[137] *Tanganyika Standard*, 12th October 1961, p.5.
[138] *Ngurumo*, 28th October 1961, p.1.
[139] On this distinction, see also Aminzade, *Race, Nation and Citizenship*, p.82.

invoked an understanding of a continentally defined, but not here territorially defined, African cultural group. Like Martin Kayamba, he understood 'Africa' to be a cultural unit, with a broadly shared way of life and underlying philosophy. In a pamphlet entitled 'The African and Democracy', he emphasised a specifically 'African' 'sense of equality'. He claimed that 'traditional African society, whether it had a chief or not…. was a society of equals', which, he continued, 'conducted its business through discussion'. He went on to assert that 'In his own traditional society the African' had seen 'no conflict between his own interests and those of his community', because 'the structure of his society was, in fact, a direct extension of his family.'[140] For Nyerere, man, ontologically, was socially embedded, born into particular histories, particular cultures and particular constellations of ideas: 'We are what all our past, known and unknown, has made us' he wrote. While, therefore, the influence of the Europeans on African life could not, and should not, be repudiated, he argued, 'An African in Africa will never simply become a black European', shaped as he was by his place in an African community. This, indeed, would be the future basis of an independent Tanganyika, and in particular *ujaama*.[141]

Julius Nyerere and his supporters, however, rejected the following assumption that the cultural unity of the continent of Africa, and implicitly of other continents, was a product of a descent which gave rise to a moral, and involuntary, obligation to serve that community. Rather, they held that human beings were free to adopt whatever ethical attitude they chose to community.[142] And for Nyerere the primary moral duty of man was not to this community of descent, but to mankind as a whole: all men were made in 'God's image', he argued, and should be treated in a way which reflected their shared humanity.[143] He was adamant, therefore, that the equal dignity of all would be recognised in the new, independent Tanganyika. Those non-Africans

[140] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, pp.103-4.
[141] *Ibid*, p.116.
[142] See distinction between 'ontology' and 'advocacy' in C. Taylor, 'Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate', in D. Matravers and J. Pike, (eds.), *Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology* (London, 2003), pp.195-212.
[143] *Tanganyika Standard*, 18th January 1960, p.1.

who had made Tanganyika their home under the colonialists would, therefore, be entitled to equal rights and status with Africans. Race would not be a criterion of citizenship.

'The crime [sic] in the world today' he argued, 'was the oppression of man by man'. It was this, he insisted, that he and his party had 'been fighting against' in their anti-colonial crusade, a crusade which for Nyerere was defined by the assertion of the equal humanity of all people. He was critical, therefore, of those who 'talk as if it is perfectly all right [sic] to discriminate against Europeans, Arabs and Indians and only wrong when you discriminate against black men,' and, in an astonishing outburst, accused those members of the National Assembly - members of his own party - who made a connection between Tanganyikan citizenship and race of 'behaving like little Hitlers'.[144] It should 'not be said by posterity', he thundered, 'that we were a bunch of hypocrites', who 'gained our freedom on a moral argument… and then threw that argument overboard, and began ourselves to discriminate against our brothers on the grounds of colour.'[145] The aim of TANU, according to Nyerere was, therefore, 'to build a country in which the colour of a person's skin or the texture of his hair is as irrelevant to his rights and duties as a citizen as it is irrelevant to his value in the eyes of God.'[146]

For Nyerere, the task of TANU was not, as many of his critics insisted, to rescue an African nation, but to assert the dignity of an unrecognised part of humanity, the same aim which underpinned his raising the possibility of creating a political unit larger than Tanganyika, discussed above. TANU he told graduate students at Boston University during a trip to America in February 1960, was 'a racial organisation which pursued a non-racial policy', a party whose membership was confined to Africans before 1962 as a stepping stone to establishing the broader ideal of a society in which the equal dignity of all was recognised, a vehicle for raising up the downtrodden.[147] The battle against 'multi-racialism', according to Nyerere, had been at heart a battle to create 'a society where the individual matters, and not the colour of his skin, or the shape of his nose', and not, as his critics

[144] *Tanganyikan Standard*, 19th October 1961, p.1 &p.5.
[145] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, p.79.
[146] *Ibid*, p.76.
[147] *Tanganyika Standard*, 20th February 1960, p.1

insisted, to claim an African nation.[148] Independence should not, and would not, mean merely the replacement of one form of racial domination by another: every 'Asian or European who has adopted Tanganyika as his home', Nyerere claimed 'is as much a Tanganyikan as a Tanganyika-born African.'[149] Non-discrimination on the basis of race was a key characteristic, he argued, of a civil and reputable community.

The emphasis on the central importance of the principle of non-discrimination was not Nyerere's alone, however. Some writers, indeed, went further than TANU's president, not only asserting the non-racial character of the nation, but going so far as to repudiate the very idea of the existence of a racially defined cultural community. Commenting on the controversy caused by the publication of the Citizenship Bill, Ibrahim M. Mushaifi, for example, called into question the conception of a world divided into discrete races associated with distinct continents. He argued that it was not only black people who came from the continent of Africa, and gave examples of people with different skin colours who could claim to be the indigenous populations of the north of the continent, casting doubt on the racial schema which divided the world, and in so doing raised serious questions over the philosophical basis of any plan to limit citizenship to Africans on the grounds that the world was naturally divided into distinct racial parts.[150]

More commonly, writers focussed on the construction of community within Tanganyika. The editors of *Kiongozi*, for example, again reacting to the publication of the Citizenship Bill, argued that the Human Rights Act enshrined the idea that 'All human beings were born free and equal in freedom and rights'. 'God', they argued, had 'created the world for the sake of all people, in order that they should live fraternally together without discriminating against those of the black race, those of the yellow race' or, indeed, any other race. 'All', irrespective of skin colour, were 'children of one father, God.' 'The foundational principal', they therefore argued, 'is that a person is not able to be discriminated against for the sake of his race', an injunction which was 'being broken by the

[148] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, p.108.
[149] *Ibid*, p.79.
[150] *Ngurumo*, Letter Ibrahim M. Mushaifi, 9th December 1961, p.2.

Boer Government in South Africa, where race is a measure of citizenship. Tanganyika', on the other hand, 'which opposes racial discrimination is not able to agree to cause it to continue on the side of our white brothers', they concluded. Echoing Nyerere, they reminded their readers that a key objective of TANU had long been 'to remove discrimination and to oppose it in any place where it exists'. Those members of the National Assembly who had spoken against the Bill had, they held, forgotten this. Skin colour, they reasserted, should not be the basis of Tanganyikan citizenship. A free Tanganyika should, rather, they insisted, strive to be a beacon of non-discrimination in the world, proof that a better kind of society was possible.[151]

Many correspondents in the African press took the same line. A.L. Hassan Mkunge, for example, argued that the error of building a society on racial lines should not be made in the future.[152] Alexander Mugonya advocated a non-racial Tanganyika in which all people were treated as individuals and their social background ignored.[153] Balthazar Masalu, asserted that it was the task of the government to protect the 'Human rights' of all people, a task which could be accomplished by using the law 'to create friendship between nations', which is to say, people of different races.[154] Taking on the longstanding understanding of *taifa* as a racio-nation, discrete biological communities of descent tied to distinct continents, J.S. Ngare questioned the wisdom of calling the Tanganyikan parliament the 'National Assembly', which he worried made it appear to be the preserve of a single racial group, rather than the meeting place of the representatives of a new non-racial Tanganyika,[155] while a later correspondent, similarly assuming that the race should have no place in the new nation, reassured him that this was exactly what the name implied, insisting that 'if he considers deeply, he will recognise that *taifa* is a word which gathers two or three tribes to be one nation in one country' or that a nation was the coming together of a number of previously separate peoples.[156] Summing things up, Joseph Leon Yawi argued that the government should ensure that there were in the future

[151] *Kiongozi*, 1st November 1961, p.6.
[152] *Ngurumo*, Letter A.L. Hassan Mkunge, 6th May 1961, p.2.
[153] *Kiongozi*, *Uhuru Na Haki Tu?*, 15th February, 1960, p.7.
[154] *Kiongozi*, Letter Balthazar Masalu, 1st October 1958, p.2.
[155] *Ngurumo*, Letter J.S. Ngare, 15th June 1961, p.2.
[156] *Ngurumo*, Letter "*Mjunguja*", 19th June 1961, p.2.

no *mataifa* 'which will be called Asian or White or African in Tanganyika'. All', rather, 'should be called '*Watanganyika*'.[157]

The basis of citizenship in the independent Tanganyikan nation would not be descent, therefore, but loyalty to Tanganyika. '[E]very citizen of Tanganyika', Nyerere told the Legislative Council in October 1958, 'irrespective of his race, as long as he owes allegiance to Tanganyika', would be 'a complete and equal citizen with anyone else.'[158] The 'duties and rights of citizenship', he argued elsewhere, 'would be based on nothing except loyalty to Tanganyika'.[159] This loyalty, proponents of this view argued, was not a product of descent. Sheik Amri Abedi, a member of the National Assembly, for example, in 'a typical speech containing humour and seriousness', rejected the assertion of his opponents that people 'could not change' - which is to say that man was capable only of serving his community of descent and, therefore, that non-Africans would continue to exploit Africans - and was adamant that 'The colour of a man's skin did not make him a loyal citizen'.[160] As man was free to adopt whatever ethical attitude he chose to community, it followed that loyalty was a question of consciously adopting the correct state of mind. On these grounds, Nyerere 'appeal[ed] to all thinking Europeans and Indians to *regard themselves* as ordinary citizens of Tanganyika; to preach no Divine Right of Europeans; no Divine Right of Indians and no Divine Right of Africans'. He was clear that 'If we all *make up our minds* to live like 'ordinary sort of fellows' [sic] and not to think' that one group was worth more than any other, then the new community could flourish.[161] What Tanganyika was, and what it was built on was, therefore, being reinvented. For these thinkers, the basis of the national community was not involuntary obligation bred by descent, but conscious choice, obligations voluntarily entered into, although no less demanding for that.

This loyalty would be proven by the meeting of two conditions. In the first place, both rejecting the efforts of the British to change their mind and attempting to combat the idea that non-

[157] *Mwafrika*, Letter Joseph Leon Yawi, 16th April 1960, p.2.
[158] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, p.64.
[159] *Tanganyika Standard*, 19th October 1961, p.1.
[160] *Tanganyika Standard*, 19th October 1961, p.1.
[161] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, p.29. My emphasis.

African minorities would have divided loyalties, Nyerere's government insisted that there would be no dual citizenship.[162] Every person would have to make a choice about where his loyalty and focus lay. This, Nyerere explained in a speech in Dar es Salaam, would enable him 'to know who is standing with one foot here and the other there', straddling nations and less than fully committed to Tanganyika.[163] As George Kahama, the Minister of Home Affairs, put it, 'Possession of Tanganyikan citizenship must mean a complete and wholehearted attachment and devotion to Tanganyika – and Tanganyika alone.' The country did not want any 'half-hearted' or 'fair-weather Tanganyikans who will make use of the privileges [of citizenship] only when things are going well', a provision, he noted, that was especially important in a country like Tanganyika 'where several races originating from different continents have made their home.'[164] People with black skin would not, on this basis, have any more or less of an interest in the fate of the country than people of other races, and could feel secure that all were working in the common interest.

Ultimately, however, Nyerere and his supporters held that the true test of citizenship, the ultimate test of loyalty, was to be found in the willingness to engage in nation-building projects, the material task of patriotic labour to increase Tanganyika's economic production, raise standards of living, and provide the tax revenues to fund social services, to selflessly put oneself at the service of the community at large. Nyerere, then, attacked the arguments of the advocates of an African-only citizenship, explicitly rejecting the view that the *maendeleo* of the African population of Tanganyika was dependent upon withholding citizenship rights from non-Africans, telling the National Assembly that 'when I am told that the way to raise their [African's] standard of living is to base our citizenship on colour I cannot believe that those who utter this rubbish have given much thought to the problem'.[165] All, regardless of race, had to take responsibility for 'driving the *maendeleo* of the country'.[166] And Mr Maswanya, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry for Commerce and Industry,

[162] Brennan, *Taifa*, p.155.
[163] *Ngurumo*, 24th October 1961, p.1.
[164] *Tanganyika Standard*, 12th October 1961, p.2.
[165] *Tanganyika Standard*, 12th October 1961, p.5.
[166] *Mwafrika*, 23rd January 1960, p.6.

suggested that this had already happened, arguing that 'Asians and Europeans have joined the war against poverty, ignorance and disease – and by doing so had become eligible for citizenship in Tanganyika'.[167] Many of Tanganyika's African population, however, remained unconvinced.

The TANU led-government was prepared to make occasional concessions to the sensibilities of those who worried about the dangers of including non-Africans as citizens of the independent state. George Kahama, for example, seeking to 'remove doubts' about the likely effects of the Citizenship Bill, and in particular the worry that granting non-Africans citizenship would enable these people 'to rob from Africans their land', told the National Assembly that while he did 'not believe the truth which is behind' this worry, existing land law would not be changed, preventing non-Africans from buying African land in an independent Tanganyika.[168] More importantly, Julius Nyerere explained that African candidates would be preferred for civil service jobs. 'Africanization', as this policy was known, was required, he argued, to give the administration of Tanganyika a 'local look'. Without positive discrimination, he went on, Europeans and Asians, the beneficiaries of the formerly racialised education system, would dominate government posts, a situation that 'would be artificial and unhealthy' in a country where the population was predominately African.[169] Despite these sops to his critics, however, Nyerere and like-minded supporters re-imagined who and what the *Watanganyika* were, shaking up the understanding that predominated in the 1940s.

The moral imperative of recognising the equal humanity of all people was widely acknowledged, or at least difficult to ignore in Tanganyika. Christopher Tumbo, indeed, the arch-critic of the Citizenship Bill, acknowledged it, even as he rejected the possibility of its application. In declaiming the Citizenship Bill, he vigorously defended himself against the allegation that the position he had taken up was discriminatory, that Africans were '*wabaguzi*', or discriminators. Such was the justice of his case, he claimed, that in his campaign to defend Africans against foreign exploitation he was 'ready to be called Hitler, Verwoeld and even a Boer'. But, he argued, to

[167] *Tanganyika Standard*, 20th October 1961, p.3.
[168] *Ngurumo*, 2nd December 1961, p.1.
[169] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, pp.99-101. On the debate around Africanization, see Aminzade, *Race, Nation, and Citizenship*, pp.79-90.

compare Africans to South Africa's racist rulers, was 'to blaspheme against God'. 'Africans from the 18th Century have shown that they are not discriminators', he claimed. They had even carried the body of Livingstone to his home after his death, recognition of their common humanity.[170] The moral ideal was difficult to escape.

Nonetheless, for many people the provisions made by the TANU government for non-African citizenship were reckless in the lack of protection they offered the African majority. Drawing on the established image of involuntary obligation being conferred by descent, they held that the TANU government's criteria for loyalty were insufficiently demanding, noting that the engagement in nation-building projects stressed by Nyerere was really a matter for the future, and could hardly be considered to be proof of the loyalty of non-Africans at the point of independence. Government policy left open, they suggested, the possibility of the on-going exploitation of the African majority. These critics made, therefore, an uneasy attempt to reconcile the emphasis on justice for an African community which had been enslaved by colonialism, an emphasis which was bound up with a sense of involuntary obligation bred by descent, and the principle of the equality of man, as represented by the moral imperative of non-discrimination. Unlike the first group, they did not deny that non-African citizenship should be possible; at the same time, they were extremely sceptical of TANU's plans.

Mathiasi D. Masanja hinted at this when he asserted in *Mwafrika* that Indians were in Tanganyika 'for their own advantage and not for the development of the country. Therefore', he concluded, 'I see that *Bwana* Nyerere will have a big work lifting the hearts of this family.'[171] A.L. Kilenga, similarly, acknowledged the abstract justice of a non-racial community, and in so doing held out the possibility of its future realisation, but stated that as things stood non-Africans still did not respect Africans and that 'it is not right to co-operate with a person who does not respect you.'[172] And attempting to reconcile the two imperatives, John Mwakangale, a member of the National

[170] *Ngurumo*, 28th October 1961, p.1.
[171] *Mwafrika*, Letter Mathiasi D. Masanja, 27th February 1960, p.2.
[172] *Mwafrika*, Letter A.L. Kilenga, 25th April 1959, p.2.

Assembly, argued that citizenship should not be a right for non-Africans, but must be earned through clear evidence of their commitment to Tanganyika over a period of time. Responding to the introduction of the Citizenship Bill in the National Assembly, he claimed that '75% of non-Africans still regarded Africans as inferior human beings' and insisted that the mere fact of 'Independence would not change this attitude'. He was critical of the willingness of TANU's leadership to allow the immediate assumption of Tanganyikan citizenship by non-Africans who met the relevant criteria, insisting that 'non-Africans should not be eligible for citizenship until five years after Independence, so that their loyalty to Tanganyika could be assessed'.[173] As it stood, 'We', the Africans of Tanganyika, 'have no proof of their loyalty', he claimed, leaving him fearful that non-Africans, in their recent professions of loyalty, were 'bluffing and cheating us'.[174] These thinkers held out the possibility of non-African citizenship, but insisted that it should not be an automatic right for Indians and Europeans. The African population of Tanganyika could not afford to distribute such privileges lightly.

This formulation contained within it both a threat and a promise. On the one hand, in the run up to independence, and in the post-independence era, non-African communities were threatened with recriminations, and ultimately expulsion, if they were held not to have proved their willingness to serve Tanganyika. But, importantly, on the other hand, it held out, however reluctantly, the possibility of non-African citizenship in Tanganyika. A series of speeches given by Philemon Paul Muro, a member of TANU's National Executive Committee, in early 1960 demonstrated the tension. Muro hit out at what he perceived to be the attitude and actions of non-Africans in Tanganyika, accusing 'foreigners' of coming 'to Tanganyika to enrich themselves and not to benefit the country', and more specifically, Asian traders of 'profiteering', claiming that 'Their riches are obtained from the African farmer', and asserted that in the future 'these matters will be changed'. But, he went on to say that engagement in activities which would help bring about the *maendeleo* of Tanganyika 'would reveal how many persons who now called themselves

[173] *Tanganyika Standard*, 19th October 1961, p.5.
[174] *Tanganyika Standard*, 19th October 1961, p.1 & p.5.

Tanganyikans really meant it.' 'SMITH, PATEL AND MAGANGA', colloquialisms for Europeans, Asians, and Africans, would labour together as equals after independence, or 'If SMITH and PATEL refuse they will leave Tanganyika.'[175]

Tanganyika, then, remained at independence, an unfinished construct. Even as an image of a community of *Watanganyika* was promoted above other, ethnic and continental, visions of community, questions opened up about who was, or who could be, a *Mtanganyika*, of what, therefore, Tanganyika consisted, as efforts were made to think through the place of settler minorities in the postcolonial future. While in the 1940s, the *Watanganyika* were assumed to be African, linked by virtue of a shared descent which gave rise to an involuntary obligation to serve the community, in the 1950s new ideas began to challenge this conception and the possibility, drawing on the assertion of the equal humanity of all people, an idea which sat at the heart of the rejection of colonial rule, of a community built upon conscious choice, of obligations voluntarily undertaken, began, with vigour in limited quarters, and somewhat reluctantly among larger swathes of the Africans of Tanganyika, to emerge. These arguments were far from easy and, indeed, threatened to tear TANU apart. While, therefore, Nyerere's moral authority was critical in embedding the moral imperative of non-discrimination, and so the possibility of non-African citizenship, in public discourse, tensions within the party over his government's citizenship provisions, as well as the related issue of the pace of Africanisation, led Nyerere to offer his resignation from his position in January 1962, barely a month after independence, an offer than was accepted by the party's National Executive Committee.[176] As these debates made clear, a civil, reputable and prosperous community required more than the mere fact of independence, a subject developed further in the following section.

[175] BNA, FCO 141/17761, Tanganyika Police Report on Philemon Paul Muro, pp. 1-2.
[176] Aminzade, *Race, Nation and Citizenship*, pp.72-3, p. 83.

V

In the 1950s colonialism was recast in Tanganyika as a barrier to the attainment of a reputable and prosperous society, and *uhuru* became widely understood to be a necessary condition for the emergence of a civil, reputable and prosperous national community. It was not, however, considered to be a *sufficient* condition. As we saw in the previous section, new issues raised by the prospect of independence bore on this question. Neither the imperative to independence, however, nor new questions raised by the prospect of power, washed away the ideas and arguments that had animated community for the previous two decades. Rather, independence supplemented them and stood alongside them, as an editorial entitled *Uhuru na Kazi*, or 'Freedom and Work', which appeared in *Kiongozi* in late 1959, made clear. The people of Tanganyika, the paper's editors argued, 'should not deceive ourselves and think it is easy work to rule ourselves'. After *uhuru,* the *Watanganyika* 'should be', they went on, 'people of work'. It was only hard work, engagement in nation-building projects, they held, which could bring the *maendeleo* the people of the territory desired. Indeed, they continued, independence, despite its established importance, could not be pursued at any cost. Specifically, they took issue with the alleged statement of a prominent member of TANU apparently urging that women 'should push their husbands outside their homes' if they were hiding themselves rather than participating in the 'fight for *uhuru*'. It should be assumed, the writer concluded, that the speaker's 'tongue slipped': if he had meant that people should 'destroy their marriages' for the sake of independence he had made 'a very big mistake'.[177] Even in the age of nationalism, hard work and disciplined households continued to be held to be the basis of civilisation.[178]

Correspondents in Tanganyika's press, then, continued to focus centrally on the sense of disorder which had long been held to characterise their world, and its presumed moral underpinning, the selfish individualism which obstructed the progress of the community. 'Good

[177] *Kiongozi*, 17th November 1959, p.4
[178] See also Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, pp.168-71.

habits', as F.M. Marenge wrote in *Kiongozi*, continued to be understood to be the basis of '*ustaarabu*.'[179] Even as debates about the possibility of non-African citizenship moved along, then, these arguments continued to focus on the *African* population of the territory. In short, it continued to be widely assumed by writers in the press that the destiny of Tanganyika was intimately, and ultimately, bound up with the attitudes and actions of the overwhelming African majority.

As in the 1940s, the payment of bridewealth proved to be a lightning rod for these arguments. For some, the payment of this fee was a matter of justice. '[E]verything which is of tradition has sufficient reason', claimed A.P. Hovyo. Bridewealth, he went on to explain, acted to compensate the family of the bride for both the loss of the women, and the expense of raising her, something that was especially important in modern times when, he suggested, parents were expected to educate female children. If, by implication, the community was to produce the kinds of people the modern world demanded, the payment of bridewealth must continue. The customs of the past were not meaningless, but the basis of civilisation, and should not be abandoned lightly.[180] Given that a thing that was paid for was more honoured than something which was given for free, wrote Anne M. Ambrose, getting to the nub of the matter, a marriage founded upon the payment of this fee would be more stable than one which was not. The payment of brideweath, she held, promoted the disciplined households which were the basis of civilisation.[181]

On the other side, the numerous critics of bridewealth (who easily made up the majority of correspondents in *Kiongozi* on the matter) insisted that the practice should be abolished and that marriages should be contracted, instead, upon the basis of 'love'.[182] A child, P.D. Kapessa scolded, was a blessing, a gift from God, not the property of the parents to be sold like cattle. Exchanging a woman for money, he went on, amounted to 'slavery', a point that was echoed by both Lucas John

[179] *Kiongozi*, Letter Mwl. F.M. Marenge, 15th December 1959, p.3.
[180] *Kiongozi*, Letter A.P. Hovyo, 1st March 1960, p.3.
[181] *Kiongozi*, Letter Anne M. Ambrose, 15th February 1960, p.3.
[182] *Kiongozi*, Letter D.C. Tibasima, 15th February 1960, p.3.

and D.C. Tibasima, who compared the custom to the 'slavery of the Arabs'.[183] This was not the practice of a decent, or free, community.

Bridewealth, its critics continued (contradicting their opponents) stood, moreover, in the way of the formation of disciplined households. D.C. Tibasima, for example, argued that the fee, and the 'greediness of parents' which stood behind it, 'should be stopped in this country of Tanganyika'. It was only when 'mutual love' was the basis of the marriage contract that the 'youths of Tanganyika [will] respect their marriage', securing the foundation of civilisation.[184] Worse, as a correspondent using the pseudonym '*Msichana Mwenye Uchungu*', or 'Girl With Grief' argued, the need to pay bridewealth prevented the formation of households by making marriage unaffordable, and, in turn, 'perpetuates prostitution' swelling the ranks of urban *malaya* and *wahuni*, the gendered representatives of societal degeneration.[185] Alexander Kasikila echoed the point, claiming that 'bridewealth is the origin of *wahuni*, illegitimate acts… thieves, prostitutes and so on'.[186] And K.N.K. Mndeme similarly claimed that 'Bridewealth is the origin of hooliganism, thieves and debauchery'. Making an analogy with the political situation, he declared his wish that the custom was killed as the multi-racial UTP had been. Its abolition, he argued, would reduce hooliganism and mean that 'our country will develop with good habits.'[187]

'DRUNKENESS and PROSTITUTION', indeed, (as *Bibi* M.A. Kiondo wrote) continued to be seen as grave threats to a civil and reputable community of *Watanganyika*, both a product and a cause of social breakdown.[188] 'Prostitution', according to Sefu S. Mohamed, showed 'the disgrace of the women of this African nation'. He asked that the punishments meted out if they were caught should be increased as a deterrent.[189] B.K. Kiberenge argued that 'it is a naked shame to see the *raia*

[183] *Kiongozi*, Letter P.D. Kapessa, 15th January 1960, p.3. *Kiongozi*, Letter Lucas John, 15th February 1960, p.3. *Kiongozi*, Letter D.C. Tibasima, 15th February 1960, p.3.
[184] *Kiongozi*, Letter D.C. Tibasima, 15th February 1960, p.3.
[185] *Kiongozi*, Letter '*Msichana Mwenye Uchungu*', 1st April 1960, p.3
[186] *Kiongozi*, Letter Alexander Kasikila, 1st April 1960, p.3.
[187] *Kiongozi*, Letter K.N.K. Mndeme, 15th March 1960, p.3.
[188] *Kiongozi*, Letter Bi. M.A. Kiondo, 15th October 1960, p.3. Original emphasis.
[189] *Mwafrika*, Letter Sefu S. Mohamed, 17th September 1960, p.2.

of this country sell their bodies.'[190] Nicolas B. Masali, insisted that prostitutes 'should not continue to destroy the reputation of our Nation of Tanganyika.'[191] Chief Francis Masanja, a member of the National Assembly, 'scolded women prostitutes who walked recklessly in public', asserting that they 'destroyed African honour and caused shame to the country', and asked, therefore, 'that they should be thought about greatly by the Government because it destroyed the honour of this country'.[192] And after late 1959, when rapid constitutional advance had been conceded, the editors of *Mwafrika* took up the theme, describing the shame they experienced watching African women in bars in Dar es Salaam strike up relationships with foreign sailors whose ships had docked in the port, hugging them publicly and telling them 'Ai lavu yuu dia!!!'(presumably a Swahilised 'I love you dear').[193] The self-respect of women continued to be held to be the basis upon which the reputation of the community was built, as a female correspondent in *Kiongozi* implied when she condemned the fashion for short skirts among young women. '*[U]staarabu*', she told her readers, did not mean imitating Europeans, which was certainly not the habit of successful, independent nations such as India and Ghana. The shortness of the skirts borrowed from European styles, she went on, was shameful to the community as a whole, particularly when paraded in venues as inappropriate as churches: 'What would a guest of India or America or Europe say if she saw them in church?' she asked. Together 'with those people who like Tanganyika to respect itself', she demanded, therefore, that the girls of Tanganyika lengthen their dresses.[194]

Prostitutes, indeed, continued to be seen not merely as a danger to the reputation of the community, but to the very existence of society, threatening disciplined communities with descent into anarchy. Prostitution, according to J.B.A. Rugeihyamu, presented four principle dangers to society: women 'Selling their bodies, [and] bringing diseases of every kind', and more importantly, creating 'lazy people living only without work, and finishing the marriages of people', undermining in

[190] *Kiongozi*, Letter B.K. Kiberenge, 15th October 1960, p.3.
[191] *Kiongozi*, Letter Nicolas B. Masali, 15th October 1960, p.3.
[192] *Mwafrika*, 8th April 1961.
[193] *Mwafrika*, 1st April 1961, p.19
[194] *Kiongozi*, Letter "*Ni aibu sana bwana*", May 1957, p.4.

one fell swoop the basis of a civilised community[195] B.K. Kiberenge made a similar argument, claiming that 'Prostitutes are indeed the origin of much wickedness', including thieving, witchcraft, and disease.[196] According to *Mwalimu* Y.Z. William, they treated 'our beloved Tanganyika with contempt', destroyed households, and diverted Tanganyikan women from having the children that would increase the strength of the nation.[197] In short, they 'destroy[ed] the country'.[198]

The prospect of independence added a new element to these longstanding arguments. Some argued that *uhuru* must be achieved by a respectable and decent community, and therefore, with independence approaching, there was more pressure than ever to eradicate bad practices. An editorial in *Kiongozi*, for example, approvingly quoted a Muslim man who insisted that the problem of prostitution should be dealt with before independence was achieved.[199] A. NJ. Mabula, similarly, argued that parents had a responsibility to prevent their children becoming prostitutes or *wahuni*. 'Parents should co-operate shoulder to shoulder to build the Africa of tomorrow, because it depends on us' he told his readers. Steps therefore had to be taken at the level of the household to ensure that this shameful practice did not continue into the independent period.[200]

For others, *uhuru* provided the opportunity to deal with a moral scourge the British had failed to control. Idi A. Salimu, for example, expressed his 'very great happiness' with the much publicised plan of the TANU Youth League in Dodoma to repatriate 'all prostitutes and *wahuni*' from towns to the countryside, as 'one step in cleaning the country and removing the big disgrace which the British failed to remove in the whole period they lived here.'[201] J.B.A. Rugeihyamu, suggested that following *madaraka* in September 1960, Nyerere's government should use its power 'as a broom' to make the Tanganyika of the future a morally cleaner place.[202] The editors of *Kiongozi* agreed, declaring that 'if TANU will succeed in removing prostitution we will all recognise that truly it

[195] *Kiongozi*, Letter J.B.A. Rugeihyamu, 15th October 1960, p.3.
[196] *Kiongozi*, Letter B.K. Kiberenge, 15th October 1960, p.3.
[197] *Kiongozi*, Letter Mwl. Y.Z. William, 15th October 1960, p.3.
[198] *Kiongozi*, Letter Ramadhani R. Itabangura, 15th October 1960, p.3.
[199] *Kiongozi*, 15th November 1960, p.4
[200] *Kiongozi*, Letter A. NJ. Mabula, 17th October 1959, p.3.
[201] *Mwafrika*, Letter Idi A. Salimu, 15th October 1960, p.2.
[202] *Kiongozi*, Letter J.B.A. Rugeihyamu, 15th October 1960, p.3.

has power in the country.'[203] And B.K. Kiberenge more confidently asserted that if TANU took up the issue then it could not fail to be successful in eliminating 'this plague in the country.'[204]

And as in the 1940s, writers in the press continued to give thought to the basis of a good community. Unsurprisingly, correspondents in the Catholic *Kiongozi* tended (echoing Henry Muoria and Daniel M. Wako) to see religion as the basis of a decent community. As Stanislaus K. Mutahyabarwa explained, 'In Africa as in Europe, religion is needed in order that we have the foundation of the best *maendeleo*.'[205] '[R]eligion' insisted the pseudonymous '*Mtanganyika*' 'is the nucleus of all good people'. It was 'useless work, he argued 'to create a party of defence without having the foundation of religion'.[206]

As independence approached, the question of how to make community not only civil and reputable but prosperous continued to feature prominently in public argument. TANU had long emphasised that independence would not by itself bring development. *Uhuru*, wrote the editor of *Sauti ya TANU* in 1957, was not 'merely as an end itself', but 'a means to the economic and social uplifting of our people'.[207] As 1959 progressed, however, following TANU's unexpectedly large victories in the Legislative Council elections of September 1958 and February 1959, the announcement of a shift away from Twining's policy of multi-racialism by the new governor, Richard Turnbull, in October 1959, and the declaration in the December of that year that *madaraka*, responsible internal-government, would be granted following a further round of Legislative Council elections in September 1960, the party's leadership began to more concertedly make this argument. As the Commissioner of Police noted (with inevitable disapproval) in May 1959:

It is an indication of his [Nyerere's] confidence that self-government is approaching rapidly that he stated throughout the tour of the Lake Province that his principal task now was the development of the African and not with the fight for self-government which was virtually won.[208]

[203] *Kiongozi*, 15th October 1960, p.3.
[204] *Kiongozi*, Letter B.K. Kiberenge, 15th October 1960, p.3.
[205] *Kiongozi*, Letter Stanislaus K. Mutahyabarwa, 16th March 1958, p.2.
[206] *Kiongozi*, Letter '*Mtanganyika*', March 1957, p.4.
[207] BNA, FCO 141/17797, (Tanganyika African National Union: Publications), *Sauti Ya TANU*, 1st July 1957, p.2.
[208] BNA, FCO 141/17747, Commissioner of Police to Office of the Chief Secretary, 25th May 1959, p.2.

'[Ev]en if the whole of Africa was free and independent' Nyerere told his countrymen on the occasion of *madaraka*, 'the struggle of the people of Africa would not be over'. Rather, the *Watanganyika* 'must use our freedom as an instrument to free ourselves from those impediments which prevent our people from reaching their full stature as human beings. The people of Tanganyika', he continued, 'the individual men and women of this country… must be freed from the impediments which have hampered their progress', impediments which, echoing the Beveridge Report, were typically given as poverty, ignorance and disease. If they were to do this, creating 'a society in which we can all take pride; where we can live in peace and co-operation with our fellow citizens and each develop our full potential within the framework of the society', Nyerere argued, then steps had to be taken beyond the mere granting of *uhuru* to encourage the material development which would break the chains of the poor.[209]

In the first place, dimly echoing the emphasis of Britain's post-war development planning, Nyerere argued that steps had to be taken to increase the 'efficiency' of agricultural work by establishing a better technical basis for development through, for example, the use of fertilisers and modern farming equipment.[210] This particular emphasis was not well-developed, however. More concertedly, Nyerere argued, *maendeleo* required the maintenance of law and order, a theme he took up in his speech on becoming Chief Minister. He was, he told the country, 'convinced that the people of Tanganyika realise… that their efforts will progress only if there is respect for the law and for public order.'[211] For TANU, disorder was the very opposite of *maendeleo*: colonialism could not give way to lawlessness.[212] Officials of the organisation therefore looked on worriedly at protests against the second colonial occupation. Before '10,000 people' in Mwanza in November 1958, Nyerere 'openly condemned the growth of disregard for authority which had developed in Lake Province in recent months' and told the people 'to obey the law just as they would be required to

[209] BNA, CO 822/2044, Text of the Chief Minister's Nationwide Broadcast on Saturday 3rd September 1960, p.2 & p.5.
[210] *Tanganyika Standard*, 27th April 1960, p.5.
[211] BNA, CO 822/2044, Text of the Chief Minister's Nationwide Broadcast, p.6.
[212] Brennan, *Taifa*, p.148.

obey it under a TANU regime', a point reinforced by other TANU officials who 'endeavoured to persuade the unruly elements of the error of their ways.'[213] Order remained a condition of progress.

More importantly, and drawing on a theme prominent in the 1940s, and intimately familiar to his audience, Nyerere insisted that the population of Tanganyika must apply themselves vigorously to disciplined labour. 'Only hard work would remove poverty, disease and ignorance', a TANU press release gravely intoned on the eve of *madaraka*.[214] Self-exploitation was the only way in which Tanganyika could be made to prosper reputably. Borrowing money from abroad to pay for development, Nyerere argued, would both compromise the sovereignty of the nation, and 'bring shame on Tanganyika'. The 'one way of causing the country to prosper', he therefore asserted in January 1961, 'is to work, to work, to work'.[215]

Nyerere, therefore, demanded that the *Watanganyika* overcome any desires they had to serve their own ends, and charged them with the patriotic task of building the nation through disciplined rural labour, in so doing demonstrating their unity. '[P]overty, he explained, 'is something that really only *you* can fight. If you have cotton unpicked on your *shamba*', he continued 'if you have cultivated half an acre less than you could cultivate, if you are letting the soil run needlessly off your land, or if your *shamba* is full of weeds, if you deliberately ignore the advice given to you by agricultural experts, then you are a traitor in the battle. You are failing all of us Tanganyikans, because you are not fighting on the limits against the common enemy of poverty.'[216] He contrasted this patriotic rural endeavour with, in particular, urban parasitism, telling the 'Africans' who, he claimed, 'walked unashamedly through the towns wearing rags… to go home to their *shambas* and earn money which would make the country rich.'[217] 'Those of my brothers who loiter around' in the towns, he asserted in April 1961, 'should leave[,] they should leave because it is bad… they should go

[213] BNA, CO 822/1363, (East Africa: Original Correspondence: African National Union of Tanganyika), Extract from Tanganyika Intelligence Reports 11th November 1958 to 10th December 1958, p.6.
[214] BNA, CO 822/2044, Press Release: New Government Will Help Those Who Help Themselves, 16th August 1960, p.1.
[215] *Ngurumo*, 19th January 1961, p.4.
[216] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, pp.114-5. My emphasis.
[217] BNA, FCO 141/17747, Southern Highlands Province Weekly Intelligence Memorandum No.14, Appendix A, p.2.

and work.'[218] '[T]he law of earning one's bread by one's sweat was eternal', he reminded the country, 'and when Tanganyika's new Government came into power only the lazy people would remain poor and those "we will find a solution for"'.[219] For Nyerere, like many thinkers in the 1940s, it was specifically agricultural work which would be the motor of development.

To fail to engage in this disciplined labour was not only to condemn the *Watanganyika* to poverty, ignorance and disease, Nyerere argued, but to disgrace them in the eyes of the world. After September [1960]', he argued, looking forward to *madaraka*, 'the British will no longer be saying that we cannot manage ourselves but will be watching to see how well we can put our house in order… To do this entailed hard work'.[220] 'The world', he argued elsewhere, 'thought of Africa as a place of mud and wattle huts'. As independence approached, Africans had the chance to 'rectify this themselves' he continued, 'by building houses in the European style. There was nothing they could not do', he concluded, 'if they worked hard enough'.[221] Having asserted their equal humanity in their quest for independence, the *Watanganyika* had now to prove it through their actions in the postcolonial period.

This emphasis on disciplined agricultural labour as the basis of a reputable prosperity was widely shared, as it had been in the earlier period. The TANU Youth League in Dodoma, for example, took steps on their own initiative in 1960, as men in towns had done for two decades, to remove 'women who shall refuse to do agricultural work and *wahuni* who do not have work' from the towns and to force them to 'return to their homes', where they could engage in useful labour.[222] Chande Saidi Alliy, a TANU official, 'urged the jobless to stop wandering about the towns, to go back to the land and earn a living.' He sought to make 'clear that "*Uhuru*" was not the signal to drink *pombe* and do no work', and 'called for greater effort, saying that he knew of a man who ordered his wife to

[218] *Ngurumo*, 3rd April 1961, p.1.
[219] BNA, CO 822/2044, Press Release: New Government Will Help Those Who Help Themselves, 16th August 1960, p.1.
[220] *Tanganyika Standard*, 27th April 1960, p.5.
[221] BNA, FCO 141/17747, Southern Highlands Province Weekly Intelligence Memorandum No.14, Appendix A, p.2.
[222] *Mwafrika*, 24th September 1960, p.3.

move his bed every time the roof leaks', rather than fix the leak himself. This sort of attitude would not do.[223] Writing in *Kiongozi* A.T. Mgomberra worried that people saw independence as an end point, rather than a beginning, and asked 'what about work?' which, he argued, was 'forever'.[224] Antony Mtunguja similarly argued that '*Uhuru* will not bring you anything more at all if we will not perform diligently the work of our hands'. Echoing Nyerere, he explained that *uhuru was* like an axe or a hoe, tools which without human effort and direction were incapable of cutting trees or cultivating the land. It was 'The effort of using *uhuru*', he argued, and not the mere fact of independence, that 'will bring accomplishments.'[225] And the member of the Legislative Council John Mwakangale, marking an interesting twist on this longstanding call to self-help, argued that 'a time of great opportunity was at hand and [the people of Tanganyika] must get up from their hands and knees and build their country'. *Uhuru*, he insisted, was a necessary condition of self-help, removing the shackles colonialism placed on manly vigour, but it must be used conscientiously to bring *maendeleo*: 'Slaves could not be expected to toil for their masters, but free men would suffer if they did not', he warned.[226] The prosperity of the nation depended on disciplined labour.

As in the 1940s, TANU contrasted disciplined rural labour not only with urban parasitism, but with the idea that people could sit idly around waiting for the Government to provide them with the social services they required. Nyerere was publicly - and perhaps controversially, given wider nationalist ideas about imperial exploitation - critical of 'African people' who when 'asked why they have not developed themselves… say the British Government does not give them enough money but gives most money to the Asians and other races'.[227] 'The new Government', he argued, borrowing a slogan from the 1940s, 'will help those who help themselves'.[228] Indeed, he held that the

[223] BNA, FCO 141/17747, Southern Highlands Province Weekly Intelligence Memorandum No.14, Appendix C, p.1.
[224] *Kiongozi*, Letter A.T. Mgomberra, 15th February 1960, p.3.
[225] *Mwafrika*, Letter Antony Mtunguja, 16th April 1960, p.2.
[226] BNA, FCO 141/17747, Extract from Special Branch Report on Political Affairs for the Period 6th – 12th December 1959, p.1.
[227] *Tanganyika Standard*, 27th April 1960, p.5.
[228] BNA, CO 822/2044, Press Release: New Government Will Help Those Who Help Themselves, 16th August 1960, p.1.

Government *could* only help those who had helped themselves. Speaking in mid-January 1961, Nyerere explained to his audience that as things stood only 44% of children received any kind of schooling, and even these did not spend long enough in the classroom. While TANU wanted all children to go to school, he continued, budgetary constraints stood in their way: a £25 million budget had to be divided between 'various departments', leaving only £3.5 million for the Department of Education.[229] If, therefore, Government provision of education, and welfare services more generally, were to expand, additional funds needed to be found. These funds, Nyerere argued, could only be obtained by 'increasing the rice in the country, increasing the coffee in the country, [and] increasing the cotton in the country', by 'fatten[ing] the purses of the people', which would give them the money to pay tax to the government, and which would, in turn, allow the government to play their role.[230] Payment of tax, therefore, came to stand alongside disciplined rural labour as a patriotic duty, a point stressed by Lawi Sijoana, a member of the Legislative Council, who asked an audience in April 1959, 'how many of them had paid their taxes for 1959'? According to newspaper reports, 'When only a few members of the crowd held up their hands, he told the others that they must pay their taxes early'; he was clear that 'It was the duty of all district representatives of TANU to pay their own taxes and to tell the people in the countryside to pay theirs.'[231]

While TANU's leadership tended to talk about disciplined agricultural labour in economic terms, correspondents in the press placed an additional emphasis, familiar from the earlier period. Disciplined agricultural labour, they implied, was not only a means of bringing *maendeleo*, but was the antithesis of the selfish individualism of the shameful prostitute and *mhuni*, a bulwark against moral decay, a civilising endeavour. It would develop the moral fibre of the community and create the basis of a strong and durable nation. Sefu S. Mohamed, therefore, saw that it 'would be suitable to reduce prostitutes who have been abundant in cities' by 'the path' of moving 'all women and all *wahuni* who do not have work in the cities' and sending 'them to farms where they will go to do the

[229] *Ngurumo*, 19th January 1961, p.4.
[230] *Ngurumo*, 19th January 1961, p.4.
[231] Hunter, 'Dutiful Subjects', pp.271-2. *Tanganyika Standard*, 28th April 1959, p.5.

work of agriculture.' He hoped that the plan of 'the TANU youth of Central Province' to repatriate such undesirables, would 'reduce' 'prostitution and hooliganism in that province and will be a suitable example for other areas of Tanganyika.'[232] Likewise, Idi A. Salimu saw the plan of the TANU Youth League to 'remove all prostitutes and *wahuni* in all towns of Tanganyika and to send them to their homes or to give them the work of cultivation' as being key to developing a civil and reputable society, although he was keen to stress that work had to be found for people who were removed in this way, and that they should not simply be removed without any thought being given to what they might do.[233] And developing the link between agricultural work and a civil community, B.K. Kiberenge explained, in a formula familiar from the 1940s, that 'It is necessary that every person should get her satisfaction by sweat [and] not [by] selling herself like this' or 'by laziness and stealing the money of others'.[234] Disciplined agricultural labour continued to be understood to be the basis not only of a prosperous society, but of a civil society.

The interacting themes of civility, reputation and *maendeleo*, came together in a stuttering debate on the question of whether or not women should pay personal tax. Writing in *Mwafrika* in mid-1960, J.R. Kallinga told his readers that 'It causes great pain to see that only men pay tax'. While unemployed men were liable for personal tax, he argued, many women worked and got 'wages equal with men' but saw their wages untaxed. The opportunity to tax women's earnings in the interest of bringing development was 'being wasted', he argued, and that 'therefore in Tanganyika' he did 'not see the reason' why tax should not be 'imposed on women'.[235] In *Kiongozi*, *Mwalimu* Pius W. Luoga took a similar line. He gave the example of two teachers, one male, one female, working for the same salary, and asked, in such cases, 'Why do women not pay tax?', a question to which he had not been able to find 'any reason at all which has satisfied me'. He recommended, in order that the Government should have 'a big heap of money', that women with employment should be taxed on their earnings, with the proviso that this obligation was removed when they resigned their

[232] *Mwafrika*, Letter Sefu S. Mohamed, 17th September 1960, p.2.
[233] *Mwafrika*, Letter Idi A. Salimu, 15th October 1960, p.2.
[234] *Kiongozi*, Letter B.K. Kiberenge, 15th October 1960, p.3.
[235] *Mwafrika* Letter J.R. Kallinga, 4th June 1960, p.2.

position.[236] If Tanganyika was to develop as people hoped, then the patriotic duty of paying tax must be borne by men and women alike.

Other people placed an additional, moral, emphasis. According to Gerson M. Manyau, for example, taxing the earnings of women was not only 'one way of increasing the wealth of the government' and 'of getting hospitals, schools and good education in Tanganyika', but, if it was levied only on unmarried women, would have the additional advantages of both giving these women an incentive to marry, and of preventing women from hiding in cities rather than engaging in the patriotic rural labour which was the basis of a durable nation.[237] For others, this moral emphasis was the sole acknowledged basis of their support for such a move. Theobald N. Msenga, for example, writing in support of a Bill introduced by the Finance Minister, Ernest Vasey, in early December 1961, days before Tanganyika achieved her independence, a Bill which 'would seek to provide that single and divorced women and married women separated from their husbands should be liable to pay the [personal] tax in exactly the same way as men', dropped any mention of the country's coffers.[238] Instead he focussed his attention solely on the Bill's moral benefits. It would 'defeat' 'our sisters', he argued, and 'cause them to be married' in order that they should avoid having to pay the tax. It would encourage the formation of disciplined households, and ensure that the 'many prostitutes who pour shame and disgrace' on Tanganyika would 'decrease', he concluded, and that those women who were already 'married will not be able to divorce recklessly for fear of this tax.'[239] It would end a practice which demeaned Tanganyika, and encourage the formation and maintenance of the disciplined households which were the basis of any decent society. The same goal led Rashidi Hamdani to the opposite conclusion. Doubting that pulling women into the tax bracket would have the effect of forcing them to return from the cities and engage in disciplined agricultural labour, he argued that such a move would in fact legitimise the practice, bringing women 'certificates of controlling prostitution', and perhaps also turning women desperate for tax money to this illicit

[236] *Kiongozi*, Letter Mwalimu Pius W. Luoga, 1st October 1960, p.3.
[237] *Mwafrika*, Letter Gerson M. Manyau, 25th June 1960, p.2.
[238] *Tanganyika Standard*, 1st December 1961, p.1.
[239] *Ngurumo*, Letter Theobald N. Msenga, 8th December 1961, p.2.

trade.[240] In the same vein, Damian Chokunegela, argued that such a tax would merely serve to increase the need of women to find work, and therefore disrupt family life.[241] While they differed on strategy, their understanding of the likely course of action, both sides agreed that even after independence, a civilised and reputable community would be built upon the foundation of industrious and disciplined rural households.

[240] *Mwafrika*, Letter Rashidi Hamdani, 16th July 1960, p.2.
[241] *Kiongozi*, Letter Damian Chokunegela, 15th November 1960, p.3.

VI

The imperative to independence was not like the coming of Christ. It did not remake humanity, washing away old arguments and old identities. Nor, indeed, did it stand entirely apart from those arguments. Instead it supplemented existing arguments and acted on existing understandings of community. A vision of a foundational community of *Watanganyika* first emerged in the public arguments of the 1940s, alongside conceptually similar visions of ethnic and racial communities, both a response to the sense of disorder that was widely held to mark the intrusions of colonial capitalism, and an object to be defended from that same disorder, a disorder which was understood in moral terms, the product of the rise of selfish individualism in the situation of the modern world. Seeking, in the context of a new imperative to independence, the sense of common purpose, of 'unity', that was held to be necessary to first uproot colonialism and then to maintain a unit weighty enough to withstand external subversion as an independent state, in the 1950s, African thinkers came to assert the priority of this community over other visions, an emphasis which proved to be relatively uncontroversial in a context in which attachment to this community was already widely shared and the dangers of colonialism well understood. More controversial, was the place of non-African immigrants, the exploitative European and Asian settlers, in the postcolonial state, a controversy which called fundamentally into question what Tanganyika was. In Kenya, this question proved equally difficult, the answers equally uncomfortable. But, on the other side of Kilimanjaro, where imaginations had been formed rather differently in the 1940s, the wider issue of how to formulate and sustain the sense of common purpose required to remove colonialism and to ensure a postcolonial future free from external subversion, generated both a greater sense of agony and a notably different formulation of unity. It is to these developments that we must now turn.